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EDITOR’S NOTE
Every year, diplomats, members of the governmental and nongovernmental 
sectors, foreign policy students and law students convene at Fordham 
University School of Law, in New York City for International Law Weekend 
(ILW).  ILW is an annual conference sponsored and organized by the 
American Branch of the International Law Association (ABILA) and the 
International Law Students Association (ILSA). The theme for ILW 2016, 
“International Law 5.0,” explored the emerging forces and new scenarios 
international lawyers are forced to confront in a changing world.
The ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law has the privilege of 
attending ILW, and soliciting articles from the legal scholars and 
practitioners who participated in the panels. The International Practitioner’s 
Notebook features articles from these distinguished scholars.  On behalf of 
the Journal, I want to thank the authors for their great contributions, and all 
the organizers and participants of ILW for allowing us to be a part of it all.
Furthermore, I want to thank Kristin Vara, Lizza Constantine, and Wes 
Byrum for their hard work at ILW.  The 2016–2017 Executive Board owes 
many thanks to our Lead Articles Editor, Katherine David—who made it 
possible for us to attend ILW to represent and promote the Journal—for her 
immense professionalism and discipline.  I am grateful and honored to have 
shared this experience with such individuals.
I would like to thank our junior and senior associates for their work on this 
publication.  To my family and friends, thank you for all your love and
support through this journey.
Finally, the Journal welcomes the elected 2017–2018 Executive and 
Editorial Board.  I am confident Volume 24 will be a just reflection of their
hard work.
Paola Palma
Editor-in-Chief, 2016–2017
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The space environment (at least where the Earth’s orbits are concerned) 
is increasingly congested. As a natural result, collisions between space 
objects are becoming more likely and much more disastrous. A collision 
would not only destroy those colliding objects, but could create a debris cloud 
that threatens many other objects in the orbit. As a response to this, the 
United States government has expressed a willingness to consider a regime 
whereby the trajectory of American satellites is subject to government 
control, similar to the air traffic management system. While this may be a 
necessary step in salvaging the space environment, legislators must be 
appropriately cautious because this level of governmental control may give 
rise to legal liability for any accidents involving American assets. This paper 
will address some of the considerations that must be made—particularly that 
the current space tracking system is not of sufficient quality to allow for 
trustworthy trajectory manipulations by the government.
                                                          
? Danielle Miller is a Research Associate in the areas of Space, Cyber, and 
Telecommunications Law for the National Strategic Research Institute based in Omaha, Nebraska. She 
is a graduate of the University of Nebraska College of Law with concentrations in National Security Space 
Law and International Corporate Law. She writes in the areas of space and arms control law.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING ACCIDENTS IN 
SPACE
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (adopted in 1971) imposes fault-based liability on states who launch 
an object into space which then causes damage to another object in space.1
Any states who contributed to the launching of such an object may be held 
liable under this agreement.2 Having an avenue like this through which 
damaged states may seek specific reparations is relatively novel in 
international law and it has only been used once.3 In 1978, the Canadian 
government demanded damages from the Soviet Union for cleanup costs 
when a Russian satellite crashed in the Canadian wilderness, spilling fuel 
waste and other contaminants.4 Under the Liability Convention, the Russian 
government was strictly liable for all damage its space object caused on the 
surface of the Earth,5 but there was significant debate as to whether that 
recourse was limited to the direct damages of the fallen satellite (which were 
limited, due to the unpopulated area in which it fell), or if the indirect 
damages associated with the cleanup were also payable to the Canadian 
government.6 Also at issue was the Soviet obligation to pay for cleanup when 
it was not afforded the opportunity to conduct it themselves.7 After lengthy 
arbitration, the Canadian government agreed to a sum of C$3 million, which 
did not encompass the total sum of their costs, but did seem to pay for some 
indirect cleanup costs.8 Overall, it is hard to glean any helpful precedent 
from this case, especially since the vast majority of accidents occur in space, 
where states are only liable if they are at fault.
The reason for the distinction between Earth accidents and space 
accidents is obvious. Where there is a possibility for human injury, state
parties to the agreement (especially non-space-faring ones) wanted a strict 
liability imposed on this extremely risky activity.9 After all, objects re-
                                                          
1. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. III, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Convention on International Liability].
2. Id. at art. V.
3. Alexander N. Yakovlev, Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, 18:4 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 899–930 (1979).
4. Id.
5. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II.
6. See generally Peter P. C. Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6:2 
J. SPACE L. 147 (1978).
7. Id.
8. Protocol Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Can.-U.S.S.R. art. I, Apr. 2, 1981, 1470 U.N.T.S. 269. 
9. Stanley Mazaroff, Exonerations from Liability for Damage Caused by Space Activities, 54:1 
CORNELL L. REV. 74 (Nov. 1968).
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entering the atmosphere have been known to wreak significant damage.10 In 
space the loss is financial, though also significant. Large satellites cost 
upwards of millions of dollars, with some reaching ten figures.11 Launch 
services that would have to be redone in the event of a loss of a satellite are 
extremely expensive. If a satellite is destroyed through the negligence of 
another party, it is reasonable to want these costs to be remunerated. The 
Liability Convention foresaw this, and provided for a mechanism. However, 
the Convention requires that countries seek damages from the Launching 
States of the object, even if the damage was caused through the negligence 
of a private organization.12 So, if a company’s satellite was damaged by the 
negligence of another, they would reach out through their national 
government and seek damages from the country of nationality of the guilty 
satellite. Launching states are free to create domestic regimes that require 
private operators to indemnify them against liability.13
In the United States, this has taken the form of a system of federal 
regulations requiring private space operators to carry insurance up to the 
maximum probable loss, an amount found by using the statutorily provided 
formula.14 The government subsidizes some losses above that number (up to 
roughly $3 billion), in an effort to incentivize American private space 
operations.15 Combined, the insurance (pursuant to its terms) and the 
government pay any claims made by injured third parties, or by other nations 
through the Liability Convention.16 However, this mechanism has never 
been activated for a Liability Convention claim. This is not because there 
have been no catastrophic losses of American satellites because of foreign
satellites—quite the opposite.17 Rather, the problem is proving negligence 
on the part of the foreign operator as required for a valid claim under the 
                                                          
10. ASSOCIATED PRESS, FOX NEWS, About 1,100 Injured as Meteorite Hits Russia with Force 
of Atomic Bomb (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/02/15/injuries-reported-afterme
teorite-falls-in-russia-ural-mountains.html.
11. The Cost of Building and Launching a Satellite, GLOBALCOM, http://www.globalcomsat
phone.com/hughesnet/satellite/costs.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
12. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II.
13. Id. at art. V.
14. 14 C.F.R. § 440.7(a) (2016).
15. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE., GAO-14-328T, COMMERCIAL SPACE 
LAUNCHES: FAA’S RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS IS NOT YET UPDATED (2014).
16. Id.
17. See Yuri Pushkin & Melissa Gray, Russian, U.S. Satellites Collide in Space, CNN (Feb. 12, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/12/us.russia.satellite.crash/index.html?_s=PM:TECH 
(explaining in 2009, a derelict Russian satellite crashed into an operational American communications 
satellite, completely destroying the two satellites and creating a major debris cloud that is a threat to the 
space environment even today).
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Liability Convention.18 Space is not easily observable, and while we are 
generally aware of where space objects are because of tracking by the Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSPOC),19 we rarely can pinpoint the exact cause 
of an accident, let alone prove negligence by international standards.
Faced with the ever-increasing number of space objects, Congress 
passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act in 2015.20
The legislation illustrated the general sense that the United States is failing 
to uphold its international obligations to “authorize and supervise” the 
activities of its nationals in space,21 which is a topic for a different paper. In 
short, the United States does not exercise any control over the behavior of 
objects while they are in space beyond a few restrictions placed on the 
licenses of remote sensing systems and communication satellites.22 As part 
of the effort to correct this failure and to address the increasingly urgent space 
debris problem, Congress requested thought on the legal ramifications of 
engaging in Space Traffic Management: a system similar to that of the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) air traffic management system 
where flight paths are assigned based on mission requirements, and can be 
altered by the government.23 Put simply: the government wants to know 
what the concerns are if a government agency is entrusted with the regulatory 
authority to make a satellite change its trajectory in order to avoid a collision. 
It is the opinion of this author that while such authority will likely be 
necessary in the future, it should be approached carefully as to avoid 
incurring liability under the Liability Convention, resulting in significant 
losses to the United States government and any indemnifying parties. To 
explore this opinion, it is important first to look at why this is a problem: the 
rise of the small satellite and space debris.
                                                          
18. Kay Hailbronner, Liability for Damage Caused by Spacecraft Proposals of Belgium, U.S.A.,
Hungry, India, and Italy, 30 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 125, 133 (1970), http://www.zaoerv.de/30_19
70/30_1970_1_t_125_141.pdf.
19. U.S. Strategic Command, USSTRATCOM Space Control and Space Surveillance,
STRATCOM.MIL (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factshee View/Article/97
6414/usstratcom-space-control-and-space-surveillance/; U.S. Strategic Command, Functional 
Components, STRATCOM.MIL, http://www.stratcom.mil/components/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017)
(explaining that the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC), located in Vandenberg, California, is a 
component of USSTRATCOM and is tasked with space surveillance and helping coordinate military 
space efforts in support of American servicemen and against hostile powers).
20. See Pub. L. No. 114–90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
21. Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 108, 129 Stat. 704 (explaining that legislation required a report on 
appropriate mechanisms to authorize and supervise all space operations to “meet the United States 
obligations under international treaties”).
22. See Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 108–109, 129 Stat. 704.
23. See Space Traffic Control, LOCKHEEDMARTIN.COM, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
news/features/2015/space-traffic-control.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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II. CONGESTED, CONTESTED, AND COMPETITIVE: SMALL-SATELLITES 
AND SPACE DEBRIS
When the space treaties were written, the only things in space were 
small government-owned satellites very few and very, very far between.
That is simply no longer the case.  Currently, there are approximately 
500,000 space objects (including debris) in orbit around Earth.24 Of these, 
20,000 are the size of a softball or larger and are trackable by JSPOC.25
Moving forward, the growth in the number of satellites will be largely due to 
the launch of small satellites, or satellites roughly five pounds or smaller that 
generally do not possess any propulsion systems or other intensive 
operational capabilities.26 Currently, the JSPOC issues conjunction warnings 
to all operators, including foreign operators and those of small satellites, 
when they are likely to collide with another object.27 However, for small 
satellites, such warnings are rather perfunctory as without propulsion 
systems, they cannot maneuver out of the collision course.28 This is 
especially true when the collision is likely to be with a small piece of debris 
barely trackable let alone maneuverable. When involved, large satellite 
operators with evasive capabilities nearly always adjust trajectory29—while 
expending the fuel to move is expensive, it’s not as expensive as losing a 
trillion dollar satellite.
The JSPOC conjunction warnings are the only governmental service of 
their kind provided by any nation.30 Several private companies have also set 
up tracking systems to alert paying customers to threats to their space assets, 
which can augment the services provided by the government.31 However, 
such data is far from perfect. First, current tracking capability is limited to 
                                                          
24. Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA.GOV (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html.
25. Id.
26. Nanosats Are Go!, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
technology-quarterly/21603240-small-satellites-taking-advantage-smartphones-and-other-consumer 
technologies.
27. See Duane Bird, Sharing Space Situational Awareness Data, AERO.TAMU.ADU,
http://aero.tamu.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/alfriend/S4.1%20Bird.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
28. Rob Matheson, Electrospray Thruster Make Small Satellites More Capable, MIT NEWS
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://news.mit.edu/2015/accion-systems-thruster-for-small-satellites-0311.
29. See Garcia, supra note 24.
30. Bird, supra note 27; see also Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 109, 129 Stat. 704 (stating that 
Congress is currently considering a re-delegation of this responsibility to a civilian agency, leaving the 
actual tracking with the Department of Defense, but allowing a civilian agency to handle the conjunction 
warnings to private enterprises).
31. See generally Llima Loomis, Private Firms Spy a Market in Spotting Space Junk,
NATURE.COM (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/private-firms-spy-a-market-in-spotting
space-junk-1.18425.
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objects ten centimeters or larger—roughly the size of a softball.32 Anything 
smaller than ten centimeters will not be catalogued or tracked, but smaller 
objects still pose a serious threat to satellites and should be avoided. Even 
something the size of a dime travelling at 17,500 mph will do a lot of damage 
to sensitive equipment (solar arrays are especially at risk). Additionally, the 
system issues conjunction warnings when an object travels within [two]
kilometers of another.33 This has resulted in a very high number of warnings 
being issued that are false alarms—the very definition of a boy crying wolf.34
For now, it is the decision of the satellite operator whether to heed the 
warning of the JSPOC, something that would likely change if a government 
agency was granted traffic management authority. This burden would be 
most heavily felt by large satellite operators with the capability to avoid 
collision, something that must be taken into consideration moving forward.
It will be important for the government to get much better at space object 
tracking before requiring operators to move on suspect information.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES “FAULT” FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE LIABILITY 
CONVENTION?
The reality is that the United States government does not operate with 
100% certainty of the location of space objects in orbit. Even with the 
introduction of Lockheed Martin’s Space Fence (a new space surveillance 
system using a mixture of space and ground assets on a higher wave 
frequency to improve object tracking)35 sometime in 2018, tracking 
capabilities will still be limited. There is significant risk of the government 
missing a conjunction, as in the Intelsat disaster, or (worst case scenario) the 
government could require a satellite operator to alter their trajectory resulting 
in a collision that otherwise would not have occurred. In the event of a 
foreign satellite being damaged or destroyed in either of these scenarios, the 
potential for liability under the Liability Convention is substantial.
The Liability Convention creates a legal duty for states not to damage 
the space objects of other states through their actions.36 In that sense, it is 
clear that if and when the United States government orders the maneuver of 
a satellite that results in damage or destruction of a foreign satellite, a 
                                                          
32. Garcia, supra note 24.
33. Brian Weeden, 2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, at 2, (Nov. 10, 2010),
https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf.
34. Id. (explaining this over-warning was largely a reaction to the tracking system failing to 
notify of the impending conjunction of the Roscosmos and Iridium satellites, resulting in one of the most 
disastrous debris-creating events in history).
35. How to Keep Space Safe, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
products/space-fence.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
36. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II–III. 
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Liability Convention claim is simple—the United States affirmatively 
engaged in behavior that resulted in damage. The United States may be able 
to point to exonerating factors37 such as faulty information in the tracking 
system or contributory negligence on the part of the foreign operator for 
failing to heed conjunction warnings (the United States would obviously 
have no authority to command a shift in trajectory for a foreign satellite). 
However, the likelihood of success of a claim for damages under the Liability 
Convention would be significant because of the government’s involvement 
in the accident. 
Where the issue is much less clear is whether an omission (failure to
require trajectory adjustment) would constitute fault for the purposes of 
establishing a claim under the Liability Convention. International law 
demands that in order for a state to be responsible, they must be in breach of 
an international obligation.38 It is unclear whether there is an international 
obligation to prevent collisions in space. The analysis is further complicated 
by the fact that until space traffic management authorities are granted, no 
state has possessed the power to prevent collisions by mandating trajectory 
adjustment.39
Given the state of the international community and international law as 
a whole, it is unlikely that international obligation to prevent space collisions 
will be read into the space treaties. However, renewed international 
commitment to the preservation of the space environment may create an 
international obligation to avoid and prevent debris-causing accidents.
International responsibility for failure to prevent may be imposed that way. 
International environmental law already recognizes a duty to prevent 
transboundary harm arising from polluting activities,40 a theory that could be 
extended to require states to act affirmatively to protect the space 
environment from preventable collisions that pollute the orbits with debris. 
Moreover, this doctrine recognizes that when the damage was the result of 
                                                          
37. Id.
38. U.N. Legislative Series, Book 25: Materials on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 97 ¶ 1, ST/LEG/SER/B/25, (2012).
39. See generally INT’L MARITIME ORGANIZATION, International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMOConventions
%20(copies)/COLREG-1972.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (comparing maritime collision regulations to 
space collision.  Interestingly, in maritime law there is a set of international regulations dedicated to 
preventing collision between seafaring vessels which impose duties on seafaring nations to prevent such 
collisions, but while maritime law is a useful analogy to space law, it is much more specific and well-
developed than international space law.  This means that the existence of such collision-prevention 
regulations can serve only as a glimmer of hope for international consensus in issues of this kind moving 
forward).
40. Lada Soljan, The General Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm and Its Relation to 
Four Key Environmental Principles, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 209, 232 (1998).
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an accident, and nobody was at fault, there is no liability assigned.41
Therefore, if the United States government fails to warn of an impending 
collision but without any negligence or wrongdoing, they could not be held 
internationally liable under this theory of international law.
However, at home the story could be quite different: domestic law 
could grant American companies a cause of action against the government in 
the event of satellite damage or destruction stemming from the government 
failing to require evasion of a potential collision—the current cross-waiver 
system does not envision a situation where the government could fail to 
uphold its end of a licensure bargain. This would be akin to filing suit against 
the FAA in the event of a failure of air traffic controllers to prevent an in-air 
collision. Because the federal government waived its immunity in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1944, it may face liability for negligent conduct 
in official duties42—such as those duties required in space traffic 
management. However, a court may find that a space traffic controller acts 
with discretion in determining whether an order to change trajectory is 
necessary, and therefore the government retains its immunity under the law.43
Case law suggests that, if the model for air traffic control is used, a space 
traffic controller may be held liable for his negligence because “operators 
merely handle operational details which are outside the area of the 
discretionary functions and duties referred to in s. 2680.”44 Ultimately, the 
differences between air and space (and the lack of a specific international 
regime like the International Civil Aviation Organization mandating air 
regulations) may distinguish a space traffic controller from air traffic 
controllers for the sake of domestic claims in negligence.
In short, by taking an active role in the maneuvering of space objects 
into and out of harm’s way, the United States government may open itself up 
to a host of international liability concerns for damage caused to space 
objects due to its actions, as well as domestic liability for failure to protect 
American space assets. Fault is much easier to prove when there is evidence 
that the opposing party either could have done something about the accident 
and didn’t, or actively caused it through bad information or negligent 
behavior.
                                                          
41. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah L. Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law,
GEO. WASH. U. L. SCH. SCHOLARLY COMMONS 1131, 1136 (2007), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=2046&context=faculty_publications.
42. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2013).
43. Id.
44. See E. Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see also U.S. v. 
Union Tr., 330 U.S. 907 (1955).
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IV. INTERMEDIATE STEPS BEFORE STM AUTHORITIES
Given the current state of the space environment (a mess), and the 
interest of Congress, space traffic management authorities seem to be a 
guaranteed eventuality. With the potential for an increase in viable cases 
brought against the United States under the Liability Convention as explored 
above, some intermediary steps should be taken before such authorities are 
granted.
First, the United States should make a significant investment in its space 
object tracking system, including those augmentations available from the 
private sector. It is unrealistic to demand companies to expend precious 
resources to maneuver away from collisions that are as likely as not to 
happen. There must be a degree of certainty in the likelihood of accident 
before space traffic management authorities can be invoked.  This investment 
should also include incentivizing the use of materials that make space objects 
easier to track—reflective paint, tracking beacons, etc. 
Second, the United States should determine (as foreign policy) an 
official position on whether failure to heed a warning constitutes negligence 
and fault for an accident in space.
Finally, the government should interface with industry to determine 
acceptable levels of collision risk operators are willing to face before 
expending resources to maneuver. As the burden will fall disproportionately 
on large satellite operators with propulsion capabilities, it must be clear how 
much government influence on their maneuvering decisions is acceptable 
before operating in the United States becomes too burdensome.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is clearly headed toward a regime in space similar to 
the air traffic management system on Earth—where a regulatory agency can 
demand a satellite move in order to avoid collision. This is not a bad idea.
The space environment is extremely congested and increasingly more 
dangerous and difficult to navigate. Introducing space traffic control may 
help clean up the mess. However, accepting that role may come with 
increased risk of liability for the actions of the government in steering 
satellites in and out of harm’s way. These risks must be carefully considered 
as space traffic management authorities are debated and built. Otherwise, the 
Liability Convention may finally be used with some regularity to demand 
payment for accidents in space (which are more and more likely to occur).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation means moving ahead of one’s time, anticipating future
needs and creating solutions for those needs. Applied to international 
arbitration, innovation usually comes by offering new services to the users 
that will benefit them in terms of predictability, efficiency and 
effectiveness.1 Also, the increased competition of arbitration services in the 
world pushes for improvements by the service-providers, accountability on 
the part of arbitrators and counsel, and in general solutions to buttress the 
legitimacy of the system as a whole.2
Our panel during the International Law Weekend in Fordham 
University assessed the status of international arbitration in Latin America 
in both the commercial and the investment arenas. One of the interesting 
subjects discussed was the Peruvian law on commercial arbitration, 
probably the most innovative in the region (together with Panama’s law). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? Principal, DJ Arbitraje, www.djarbitraje.com. Taken from the presentation on the panel 
“International Arbitration in Latin America, Are we Innovating or Catching Up?”, during the 
International Law Weekend, on 27-29 October 2016 at Fordham University, New York City. The 
author thanks the invaluable work carried out by Valeria Garro, of DJ Arbitraje.
1. Kimberley Chen Nobles, Emerging Issues and Trends in International Arbitration, 43 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 77, 82 (2012).
2. Id. at 84–85.
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In regards to investment arbitration, the current tensions between the 
regulatory power of the State and the rights of foreign investors were 
addressed, among other issues.
My contribution turned on the local institutions in charge of handling
usually mid-size international/regional cases and how they are faring in 
terms of the publication of statistics, diversity in their panels, and the use of 
technology, issues that have also been tackled by global institutions. For 
that purpose, I conducted a survey among directors of regional arbitration 
institutions, using a simple questionnaire. The questionnaire (see annex 1) 
was sent to eighteen arbitration institutions (see annex 2) from various 
jurisdictions in Latin America in October 2016.3 It was a user-friendly
online survey comprised of a few straightforward questions. All but one of 
the directors of the institutions completed the questionnaire. 
The purpose of the survey was to get an idea of how institutions 
generally perform on three main issues but not to delve into the topics in 
depth. 4 For example, although sixteen institutions indicated that they 
administered international cases, it is not clear whether they can do so per 
their rules or whether they are actually handling international cases in 
practice. If they are, the question that is begged is whether “international” 
includes cases between local companies that are subsidiaries or concerns of 
foreign companies.
As will be shown, the results do provide a general overview of the 
institutional development in the three covered areas.
II. RESULTS
As mentioned, all institutions but one participated in the survey. The 
results were presented at the International Law Weekend in a PowerPoint
format (see Annex 3). What follows is a description of the findings.
A. Transparency
The legitimacy of international arbitration as “private justice” is being 
constantly challenged. To counter this concern arbitral institutions around 
the world have made efforts to include more transparency in their work, by 
making more information publicly available.5 This is the case with global 
institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). The survey of national 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3. The original questions were in Spanish.  A free translation into English is attached as 
Annex 1; A list of institutions is attached as Annex 2.
4. Time was an additional factor, as the panel was designed to be dynamic, with only 10 
minutes per panelist in order to incite dialogue among the panelists.
5. See Nobles, supra note 1, at 82.
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institutions in Latin America strived to find the ways in which national 
institutions are measuring up to this challenge, by asking a) whether they 
publish statistical information and if so, b) what type of information, c) in 
what format, and d) with what frequency.
Only six respondents indicated that they publicized statistics at all. In
regards to the type of information, respondents were given a non-exhaustive 
list, to which they could add other types of information. Of the institutions 
that do publicize data, one institution in particular publishes the number of 
cases, the origin of both the parties and arbitrators, the amount and nature 
of the dispute, and the duration of the arbitral proceedings.
All but one of the remaining five indicated that they make public the 
number of cases, with three of those publishing also the amounts in dispute 
and in some cases, other data such as origin of the parties and arbitrators.
The remaining institution publishes the origin of the parties, the constitution 
of the arbitral tribunal, and the amount in dispute. The only item that none
of the respondents indicated publicizing is the costs of the arbitration.
Five of the six positive respondents stated that they make data known 
at conferences, while four of those make the information available on their
website.6 While two responded that they provide information upon request, 
one of them replied that they do so through e-mailings to subscribers and
another one replied that they do so at meetings.  One institution replied that 
they belong to the Dispute Resolution Data (DRD).7
About the frequency of the publications, while three institutions stated 
that they provided the information on an ongoing basis, one stated that they 
do so twice a year and one, once a year.8
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6. Some of the participating institutions have additional statistical information on their 
websites, although they did not state so.
7. Dyalá Jiménez Firgueres, Are Arbitration Institutions in Latin America Innovating?  A 
survey on Transparency, Diversity, and Use of Technology, app. 3, slide 3 (2017) [hereinafter Annex 3]; 
see DISPUTE RESOLUTION DATA, http://www.disputeresolutiondata.com/about_dc (last visited Feb. 2, 
2017) [hereinafter DRD] (DRD is a global database that provides information from more than 130 
institutions around the world on an aggregate basis to members, which enables them to assess risk 
management and strategy when presented with cases of arbitration or mediation.); (reasoning it is 
noteworthy that out of the seventeen institutions that replied, seven are contributors to DRD, but only 
one arbitral center included DRD in its response.); compare DRD, Annex 3, supra note 7, at slide 2, 
with slide 4 (the institution that indicated its alliance with DRD provides the information on a quarterly 
basis, presumably the other DRD members do so as well.).
8. Annex 3, supra note 7, at slide 4 (reasoning the institution that indicated its alliance with 
DRD provides the information on a quarterly basis, presumably the other DRD members do so as well.).
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B. Diversity of Arbitrators
The more diverse the supply of arbitrators is, the higher the 
opportunities are to appoint more fitting professionals as arbitrators in 
international cases. Non-nationals, women and arbitrators from younger 
generations can bring new perspectives and practice in the field of 
arbitration in Latin America, and this is what this segment of the 
questionnaire aimed at assessing.
The first question in this segment was whether the centers have 
rosters. Fifteen replied that they do. Out of those, only fourteen provided
additional information.
Three institutions indicated that more than 20% of arbitrators are from 
outside the list, with one as much as 25%.
In regards to the questions on diversity, they were focused on foreign 
arbitrators, women, and arbitrators of ages 30 to 50. As to foreign 
arbitrators, one institution stated that 65% of the arbitrators on their list are 
foreign, while four indicated that there were no foreign nationals on their 
lists at all. The remaining responses (eight) ranged from 10% to 39%,
along with one institution stating that 5% of their panel members are 
foreign.
On the aspect of gender diversity, the replies ranged from 8% to 40%
of women on their panels. Only one respondent replied that essentially
there are no women (1%) on that institution’s list. Twelve institutions 
indicated that they are aware of the Equal Representation in Arbitration 
(ERA) Pledge, but only six of those had signed it.
Finally, regarding the age factor, the questions were divided in two:
arbitrators aged 30 to 40 and arbitrators aged 40 to 50. As to the former, 
most answers ranged from 7% to 25% of the arbitrators on the list, with one 
institution stating that 60% fall within that age group; one responded 0.5%
and another, 2%. As to ages 40 to 50, most replied that between 25% and 
65% of their members were of that age group, while one replied that 90%
of the arbitrators on their list corresponded to that age range. On the other 
end of the spectrum, one institution responded that only 12% of the 
arbitrators belonged to that age group.9
C. Use of Technology
This segment is particularly relevant in the region, because 
institutional rules in Latin America have evolved from a quasi-judicial 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9. See Annex 3, supra note 7, at slide 5 (that same institution replied that only 0.5% are aged 
30–40, so presumably most arbitrators are more than 50 years old).
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procedure to a more flexible system. The answers to how much electronic 
communications are being used to help gauge how far that evolution is. 
Out of the seventeen respondent institutions, four replied that they still 
work solely with physical files, and the remaining thirteen hold a physical
file in addition to an electronic version. Six institutions do not allow an 
electronic signature of the arbitrators. Of the remaining eleven that do, six 
require the agreement among the arbitrators, three between the parties, and 
two require both the arbitrators and the parties to agree.
All institutions send out electronic communications/service to the 
parties, out of which only five do so exclusively, without the physical 
backup.10
Five centers have their arbitrators communicate solely by electronic 
means with the parties. 11 Two institutions replied that they allow the 
arbitrators to communicate electronically save for the award, which is 
served in the physical version.  Three centers provide that the parties must 
agree on the electronic communication by the arbitrators. The remaining 
seven centers encourage arbitrators to communicate through electronic 
means but do not impose it.
Finally, it is interesting that only one institution replied that it does not 
provide facilities for videoconferencing. 
III. CONCLUSIONS
In the process of modernization of arbitration in Latin America, there 
are still aspects where certain arbitral centers are lagging behind, while 
other centers are remarkably modern. With some exceptions, institutions in 
the region are up to date with the use of technology. This is commendable, 
since only a few years ago service was still carried out in person in most 
countries, and the arbitrators and parties had to visit the centers to study the 
files.
In terms of diversity on the panels, institutions have relatively diverse 
panels in terms of gender and age, with a bit less in terms of foreign 
arbitrators. Regarding the former, the average percentage of women in the 
rosters is 18%, which is probably higher than the statistics globally, with 
exception of the ICC.12 Unfortunately, there was no question on how many 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10. See Annex 3, supra note 7, at slide 8 (explaining that there appears to be a slight 
inconsistency, since all centers indicated that they hold a physical file; unless their understanding of 
“physical file” excludes communications from the institution).
11. See Annex 3, supra note 7, at slide 8 (reasoning three of those answered that they work 
solely with electronic files, which means they are virtually paper-free).
12. Lucy Greenwood & Michael A. Fitts, Getting a Better Balance on International 
Arbitration Tribunals, 28 J. LONDON CT. INT’L ARB. 651, 656 (2012) (“in 2012, it was estimated that 
the percentage of women appointed to international commercial arbitration tribunals is around 6%”); 
INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, ICSID ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2016) (the latest ICSID 
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women are actually appointed in the cases. 13 Usually, the higher the 
chances of appointing arbitrators who are involved in international 
arbitration, the higher the chances are that the international culture, which 
tends to be more flexible, permeates into national institutional proceedings. 
Finally, in what respects the publication of statistics, this is where 
institutions in Latin America are frankly weak. Keeping statistics is 
something generally done to a lesser extent in Latin America when 
compared to other regions, and it is a shame. The more information that is 
publicly available, the more transparent—and therefore more accountable—
the institution is. Also, if institutions were to gather statistics, they can 
become more efficient, more effective and gain competitiveness, as they 
can address concerns and respond to market trends.
?
report shows that approximately “10% of the appointees of fiscal year 2016 were women”); INT’L
CHAMBER OF COM., ICC ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS, http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-andServices/
Arbitration-and-ADR/ICC-Arbitral-Tribunals/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
13. From information gathered outside the survey, the author knows that one arbitration center 
in Perú has 8% of women in the roster but in practice, 13% of the appointees are women.
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ANNEX 1
The following are the survey questions (translated from the original 
survey questions, which were in Spanish). 
1. Does your institution handle international cases, i.e., 
cases between parties/interests from different 
jurisdictions?
2. Does your institution publish statistics on the cases it 
handles, i.e., number of cases, origin of the parties, 
costs, nationalities of arbitrators, amounts in dispute, 
etc.?
3. Please specify the type of statistics that your 
Institution publishes.
4. How is the information about your institution's 
statistics made publicly available?
5. How often is information about your institution's 
statistics published?
6. Does your institution have a list of arbitrators?
7. What percentage of the arbitrators in your institution's 
list are foreign individuals?
8. What percentage of the arbitrators in your institution's 
list are female?
9. What percentage of the arbitrators in your institution's 
list are 30–40 years old?
10. What percentage of the arbitrators in your institution's 
list are 40–50 years old?
11. May parties appoint arbitrators outside the list?
12. What percentage of the arbitrators are appointed 
outside the list?
13. Are you aware of the Equal Representation in 
Arbitration (ERA) Pledge?
14. Has your institution signed the ERA Pledge?
15. Does your institution work only with paper documents 
of the cases it handles?
16. Does your institution provide an electronic file to the 
parties and counsel?
17. Does your institution allow arbitrators to use 
electronic signature in their orders, decisions, awards?
18. Does your institution use electronic service of 
institutional communications?
19. Does your institution allow arbitrators to use 
electronic service of its communications, orders, 
decisions, awards?
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20. Does your institution provide users with 
videoconferencing facilities?
21. Question in regards to being included in the list of 
institutions that participated in the survey that would 
be revealed in the International Law Weekend 2016 or 
remain anonymous. 
2017] ?Jiménez Figueres 297
?
?
ANNEX 2
The following are the institutions that participated in this survey, 
carried out via website in October 2016. 
1. Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje Comercial de la 
Cámara Argentina de Comercio, CEMARC 
(Argentina)
2. Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara Boliviana de 
Hidrocarburos y Energía (Bolivia)
3. Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación de la Cámara de 
Comercio Brasil-Canadá (Brazil)
4. Centro de Arbitraje y Conciliación de la Cámara de 
Comercio de Bogotá (Colombia)
5. Centro Internacional de Conciliación y Arbitraje 
(Costa Rica)
6. CAM Santiago (Chile) 
7. Centro de Resolución Alternativa de Controversias de 
la Cámara de Comercio y Producción de Santo 
Domingo (Dominican Republic) 
8. Centro de Arbitraje y Mediación AmCham Quito 
(Ecuador) 
9. Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje de la Cámara de 
Comercio e Industria de El Salvador (El Salvador)
10. Comisión de Resolución de Conflictos de la Cámara 
de Industria de Guatemala (Guatemala)
11. Centro de Mediación y Arbitraje Comercial de la 
Cámara Nacional de Comercio de la Ciudad de 
México, CANACO (Mexico)
12. Centro de Arbitraje de México (Mexico)
13. Centro de Conciliación y Arbitraje de Panamá 
(Panama)
14. Centro de Arbitraje - Cámara de Comercio de Lima 
(Peru)
15. Centro de Arbitraje de AmCham (Peru)
16. Centro de Arbitraje de la Cámara de Caracas 
(Venezuela)
17. Anonymous
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides an overview of justice for crimes perpetrated in the 
former Yugoslavia during the wars in the 1990s.  It concludes with reflections 
about lessons learned for future accountability endeavors—particularly, the 
model of having a three-tiered approach to justice in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
consisting of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY or 
Tribunal), the hybrid War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (War Crimes Chamber), and local courts in Bosnia.  It ends with 
reflections as to whether, if it someday becomes possible, such a three-tiered 
approach would be a good model to ensure justice for crimes being 
perpetrated in Syria or in any other situation of very large-scale atrocities.
II. REFLECTING ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ICTY
Tremendous strides have been made over the past twenty years towards 
ensuring justice for crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia during the 
1990s.  Looking back to the time when the Dayton Peace Accords were 
negotiated,1 justice was still in its infancy.  The ICTY had been created in 
                                                          
* Associate Clinical Professor, Center for Global Affairs, NYU-SPS.  Professor Trahan is 
author, inter alia, of a comprehensive compilation of case law by the ICTY, entitled GENOCIDE, WAR 
CRIMES, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASELAW OF THE 
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1993 by the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council,2 to sit in The Hague, 
Netherlands.  The Tribunal could not be located in the former Yugoslavia, 
since, at the time of the Tribunal’s creation, armed conflict was still ongoing 
in the region.
It took time for the Tribunal to commence prosecutions.  It started with 
the prosecution of the relatively low-level case of Duško Tadi?,3 because he 
was already in custody in Germany.  In the early years, the Tribunal was not 
yet taken particularly seriously.  For instance, despite its creation, in July 
1995, Republika Srpska Armed Forces (VRS), under the command of 
General Ratko Mladi?, committed the Srebrenica massacre4—subsequently 
adjudicated to constitute genocide.5 Clearly, they were not deterred by the 
Tribunal’s early existence.  Even when self-proclaimed President of 
Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadži?, and VRS military commander Ratko 
Mladi? were indicted,6 they initially traveled around openly, with little fear 
of arrest.7 And, Serbian forces were not deterred in 1999 from commencing 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.8
Yet, eventually, the first international criminal tribunal since the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg9 commenced trials and 
                                                          
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (HRW 2006).  Research assistance 
for this article was provided by Erin Lovall.
1. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Peace 
Agreement”), Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Fed. Repub. Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75.
2. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
3. Prosecutor v. Tadi?, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), aff’d, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
4. Dan Bilefsky & Somini Sengupta, Srebrenica Massacre, After 20 Years, Still Casts a Long 
Shadow in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/world/ 
europe/srebrenica-genocide-massacre.html?_r=1.
5. Prosecutor v. Krsti?, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
6. Prosecutor v. Karadži? & Mladi?, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Initial Indictment “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 24, 1995); Prosecutor v. Karadži? & 
Mladi?, Case No. IT-95-18-I, Initial Indictment “Srebrenica” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 14, 1995).
7. GARY J. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES 
TRIBUNALS 249, 255 (2000).
8. Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting, U.S. DEP’T STATE 1, 3 (1999), https://www.
state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/pdf/kosovii.pdf.
9. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (agreement creating the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
to be first held at Nuremberg).  The Tribunal tried a total of twenty-two defendants, of whom nineteen 
were convicted, twelve of whom were sentenced to death.  For background on the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
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eventually became a full and well-functioning institution.10 Karadži? and 
Mladi? were driven off the political and military stages, respectively, with 
Karadži? disguising himself under an assumed name11 and Mladi? in hiding12
until their eventual arrests.13 The Tribunal eventually issued indictments all 
the way up to Serbian President Slobodan Miloševi?,14 although he died
during the pendency of his ICTY trial.15 The Tribunal also succeeded in 
indicting on all sides of the conflict, including crimes perpetrated by Bosnian 
Muslims, Croats, and Kosovar Albanians.16
The Tribunal has made historic jurisprudential firsts.  There have been 
prosecutions focused on the use of rape as a weapon of war—for instance the 
running of a notorious rape camp in Fo?a, in the Kunarac decision.17 Rape 
was eventually prosecuted as a crime against humanity,18 a war crime,19 and 
                                                          
see generally MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE NUREMBURG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945–46: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY (Katherine E. Kurzman et al. eds., 1997).
10. The ICTY indicted 161, resulting in 83 convictions, 19 acquittals, 7 ongoing proceedings, 
and 2 to be retried by the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). Infographic:  ICTY 
Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/content/infographic-icty-facts-figures (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter ICTY 
Infographic].
11. Nicholas Kulish & Graham Bowley, The Double Life of an Infamous Serbian Fugitive, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23karadzic.html?pagewanted
=all.
12. How Ratko Mladic Stayed Hidden After Bosnia War, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13562118.
13. Julian Borger, Radovan Karadzic, Europe’s Most Wanted Man, Arrested for War Crimes,
GUARDIAN (July 21, 2008, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/22/warcrimes.
internationalcrime; Colum Lynch, Serbia Arrests Ratko Mladic on War Crimes Charges, WASH. POST
(May 26, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/serbia-arrests-ratko-mladic-on-war-crimes-
charges/2011/05/26/AGXID1BH_story.html?utm_term=.c6e4adcad9b1.
14. Prosecutor v. Miloševi?, Case No. IT-99-37, Initial Indictment “Kosovo” (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999).
15. Molly Moore & Daniel Williams, Milosevic Found Dead in Prison, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/11/AR2006031100525. html.
16. See generally ICTY Case List, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
17. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 28 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
18. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 127–
29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kvo?ka, Case No. IT-98-
30/1, Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 175, 180–83 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) 
aff’d, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 12, 2002).
19. Prosecutor v. Kvo?ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 395 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2005); Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A ¶¶ 127–29 
(2002).
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a form of torture.20 It also was prosecuted as an underlying crime of genocide 
by the ICTY’s sister tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR),21 created to sit in Arusha, Tanzania, and try top perpetrators of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.22
The ICTY has issued judgments that the killing of more than 8300 
Bosnian men and boys in and around Srebrenica starting on July 11, 1995 
was genocide, in Krsti?,23 as well as other, decisions.24 It charged a high-
level female perpetrator, the President of Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavši?, 
who entered a guilty plea to persecution as a crime against humanity.25
Ultimately, of the 161 indicted, the Tribunal achieved a 100% success 
rate on arrests, with no fugitives at large.26 Of course, the Tribunal did not 
achieve this alone.  None of the war crimes tribunals have arrest capabilities, 
but rely upon state cooperation to effectuate arrests.27 In the former 
Yugoslavia, in the early years, the countries in the region showed no interest 
in cooperating, but that gradually changed with the policy of 
“conditionality,” whereby the United States conditioned financial assistance 
to countries in the region, and the European Union (EU) conditioned progress 
                                                          
20. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1A ¶¶ 150–51 (2002).
21. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 688 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (explaining rape and other acts of sexual violence constitute infliction of 
“serious bodily or mental harm” on members of the group.); see Jennifer Trahan, Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity:  A Digest of the Case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (HRW 2010) (for a compilation of the case law of the ICTR).
22. S.C. Res 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (resolution created the ICTR).
23. Prosecutor v. Krsti?, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
24. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovi?, Case No. IT-05-88, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) aff’d, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case 
No. IT-05-88/2, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012), 
aff’d, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Apr. 8, 2015).
25. Prosecutor v. Plavši?, Case No. IT-0039 & 40/1, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003). Cf. Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda June 24, 2011), app’l filed (parallel ICTR case convicting Rwandan Minister 
for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, for genocide, conspiracy 
to commit genocide, and incitement to rape); see generally Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Nyiramasuhuko:  The 
Mother Who Awarded Rape for Murder, WORLD POST (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/sam-sasan-shoamanesh/nyiramasuhuko-the-mother-_b_922216.html (explaining how Nyiramasuhuko
was the first woman convicted by the ICTR, and first woman to be tried and convicted by an international 
criminal tribunal).
26. See ICTY Infographic, supra note 10.
27. Mary Margaret Penrose, No Badges, No Bars:  A Conspicuous Oversight in the 
Development of an International Criminal Court, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 621, 625 (2003).
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towards EU accession, on cooperation with the ICTY, particularly arrests and 
surrenders.28
The ICTY has also adjudicated cases covering key major crime scenes.  
For instance:
a) the sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo (the Gali? and 
Dragomir Miloševi? cases);29
b) the decision that Srebrenica is genocide (the Krsti? and other 
cases);30
c) atrocity crimes in camps in Prijedor, such as running of the 
notorious Omarska camp;31 and
d) the Vukovar hospital massacre.32
Additionally, the Tribunal has produced a wealth of generally well-
reasoned jurisprudence.  There is now abundant case law on the parameters 
of the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, as well 
as individual and command responsibility, and procedural and other 
substantive law.33
                                                          
28. See JULIE KIM, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22097, BALKAN COOPERATION ON WAR CRIMES 
ISSUES (2008); see also STEVEN WOEHREL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21686, CONDITIONS ON U.S.
AID TO SERBIA (2008).
29. Prosecutor v. Gali?, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2004), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 3, 2006); Prosecutor v. Miloševi?, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, 
Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007), aff’d, Case No. IT-
98-29/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009).
30. See Prosecutor v. Krsti?, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Popovi?, Case No. IT-05-88, Trial 
Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010) aff’d, Case No. IT-05-
88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015)
31. See Prosecutor v. Tadi?, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), aff’d, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see also Prosecutor v. Kvo?ka, Case No. IT-98-30/1, 
Trial Chamber Judgment ¶¶ 175, 180–183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) 
aff’d, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 12, 2002).
32. Prosecutor v. Mrkši?, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007), aff’d, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009).
33. For a compilation of the case law, see JENNIFER TRAHAN, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A TOPICAL DIGEST OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Human Rights Watch 2006).
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Nonetheless, there are some less successful moments at the ICTY.
When Slobodan Miloševi? died mid-way through his trial,34 the Prosecutor 
was roundly criticized for trying him on too many counts35—three separate
indictments with a total of sixty-six counts, covering crimes in Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo.36 That of course is an easy criticism to make in 
hindsight, and a counter-argument for broad charging can also be made for 
the sake of establishing a comprehensive and accurate historical record for 
future generations, and ensuring justice for the most significant crimes.
There are high-level acquittals in the cases of Mom?ilo Periši?, chief of the 
general staff of the Yugoslav Army, VJ,37 and Croatian General Ante 
Gotovina, who was the operational commander of the southern portion of the 
Krajina region during the Croatian military offensive known as “Operation 
Storm.”38 Both acquittals seem less than well-reasoned,39 as does the recent 
acquittal in the Šešelj case.40 These I would suggest, are the jurisprudential 
low-points.  Subsequent Appellate Chambers have since rejected the Periši? 
aiding and abetting standard,41 and the Šešelj case is on appeal, so may still 
be reversed.
Additionally, the ICTY’s Outreach Program has faced difficulties in 
conveying the achievements of the ICTY to the public in the former 
                                                          
34. Moore & Williams, supra note 15.
35. Molly Moore, Trial of Milosevic Holds Lessons for Iraqi Prosecutors, WASH. POST (Oct. 
18, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/17/AR2005101701496.html.
36. Prosecutor v. Miloševi?, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Amended Indictment “Croatia” 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 28, 2004); Prosecutor v. Miloševi?, Case No. IT-02-54-
T, Amended Indictment “Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 
2002); Prosecutor v. Miloševi?, Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Second Amended Indictment “Kosovo” (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 16, 2001).
37. Prosecutor v. Periši?, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013).
38. Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012).
39. For a critical discussion of the Periši? case, see Jennifer Trahan & Erin Lovall, The ICTY 
Appellate Chamber’s Acquittal of Mom?ilo Periši?:  The Specific Direction Element of Aiding and 
Abetting Should be Rejected or Modified to Explicitly Include a ‘Reasonable Person’ Due Diligence 
Standard, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 171 (2015).  For a critical discussion of the Gotovina case, see Janine
Natalya Clark, Courting Controversy:  The ICTY’s Acquittal of Croatian Generals Gotovina and Marka?,
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 399 (2013).
40. Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2016).
41. See Prosecutor v. Staniši?, Case No. IT-03-69-A, Appeals Chamber?Judgment,?¶¶ 106–
08?(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 9, 2015) (“the Trial Chamber erred in law by 
requiring that the acts of the aider and abettor be specifically directed to assist the commission of a 
crime”); Prosecutor v. Popovi?, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); Prosecutor v. Šainovi?, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014).
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Yugoslavia.42 The program was created late, only in 1999, as the need for 
outreach was not originally envisioned when the Tribunal was created.43
Unfortunately, it has never been seen as particularly central to the Tribunal’s 
work, remaining over the years outside the Tribunal’s ordinary budget.44 But 
most of all, it has faced particular challenges given, first, Republika Srpska 
and Serbian denial of crimes,45 and then later, partial denial of crimes, which 
represents the current state of affairs.46 For instance, authorities from 
Republika Srpska and Serbia now admit crimes happened at Srebrenica, 
which they originally did not, but deny that the crimes constitute genocide, 
despite that determination having been adjudicated multiple times.47 This 
denial was repeated at the international level when Russia vetoed the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) draft resolution before the U.N. Security Council that, on 
the twentieth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, would have 
acknowledge the crimes as genocide.48
Thus, despite the ICTY’s existence and all its accomplishments, 
unfortunately, we still see alarmingly nationalistic narratives coming from 
some political figures and others in the region.  Perhaps it is unrealistic to 
think that any one tribunal, no matter how successful, could change that 
dynamic. Overall, however, the work of the ICTY has been a success.
III. DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
The victims of crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia no doubt 
would not fully share this optimistic assessment of the ICTY’s work.49 A
                                                          
42. David Tolbert, Reflections on the ICTY Registry, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 480, 482 (2004).
43. Id.
44. ICTY Outreach Programme Annual Report, UNITED NATIONS, 37 (2013), 
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/annual_reports/annual_report_2013_en.pdf.
45. Koen S. Kluessien, A Conspiracy of Denial:  Serbian Politicians and their Unwillingness 
to Deal with the Troubled Past of the Srebrenica Genocide, CLARK U. CLARK DIGITAL COMMONS (Apr. 
10, 2015), http://commons.clarku.edu/chgspapers/15. 
46. Mersiha Gadzo, Time to Identify Srebrenica Massacre as Genocide, AL JAZEERA AM. (July 
8, 2015, 2:45 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/7/20-years-later-it-is-time-to-identify-
srebrenica-massacre-as-genocide.html.
47. Id.; see also Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2 (2012); Prosecutor v. Popovi?, Case No. IT-05-
88, Trial Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), aff’d, Case No. 
IT-05-88-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); 
Prosecutor v. Krsti?, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 530–40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
48. Russia Vetoes UN Move to Call Srebrenica ‘Genocide’, BBC NEWS (July 8, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33445772.
49. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Views on War Crimes, the ICTY, and 
the National War Crimes Judiciary, Survey 30 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.academia.edu/10883773/
 
310 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 23:2
 
focus on higher-level perpetrators at the ICTY has meant that most first-hand
trigger-pullers—those who murdered the person “down the street”—would 
not be prosecuted in The Hague.50 Such prosecutions have been left to courts 
in the region.51
Thus, for example in Bosnia, there is a three-tiered approach to justice.52
In addition, to the ICTY, there is the hybrid War Crimes Chamber,53 as well 
as local courts.  The War Crimes Chamber, which was developed in part to 
handle ICTY transfer cases as the ICTY was implementing its “completion 
strategy,”54 is based on an interesting model of a hybrid tribunal that converts 
to a national court.  It started with panels of international judges in the 
majority, then converted to international judges in the minority after a certain 
period of years, and finally converted to fully national panels, which is where 
it stands today.55 Thus, it started as an internationalized institution and 
continues as a local war crimes—and organized crime—chamber.56 This 
aspect of the War Crimes Chamber is a merit-worthy model, as opposed to 
other hybrid tribunals that, despite other significant accomplishments, have 
simply closed after a period of years, such as the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.57 The War Crimes Chamber, by contrast, is designed to continue 
                                                          
Why_testify_Witnesses_motivations_for_giving_evidence_in_a_war_crimes_tribunal_in_Sierra_Leone
(e.g., question:  “How do you think that the trials before ICTY affect the victims of war crimes and their 
families?” 45% of respondents chose the response:  “The victims and their families do not see the ICTY 
as just, because those who made them victims are not tried or are tried too slowly and they are much too 
leniently punished.”).
50. Understanding the International Criminal Court, ICC, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs
/pids/publications/uicceng.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
51. Id.
52. See generally Delivering Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  An Overview of
War Crimes Processing from 2005 to 2010, OSCE 1, 43 (2011), http://www.osce.org/bih/108103?
download=true. 
53. The Case Law of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, COURT OF BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA, http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
54. Pipina T. Katsaris, The Domestic Side of the ICTY Completion Strategy:  Focus on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 78 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNALE 348 (2007).
55. Bogdan Ivaniševi?, The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  From Hybrid 
to Domestic Court, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. 1, 943 (2008) (regarding the inclusion and 
eventual phase-out of international personnel).
56. Id.
57. Justice in Motion:  The Trial Phase of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 2, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/11/02/justice-motion/trial-phase-special-court-
sierra-leone [hereinafter Justice in Motion].  The Special Court for Sierra Leone adjudicated cases against 
the three key warring factions during Sierra Leone’s 1991–2002 civil war. Id. The Special Court is 
currently in its residual mechanisms phase.  Special Court for Sierra Leone Residual Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, RSCSL, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (discussing details of SCSL 
residual mechanism).
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prosecuting war crimes cases long after the international staff has left.58
However, the work of the War Crimes Chamber has slowed in the last few 
years, with criticism that they are prosecuting only simple cases, and not 
coming even close to delivering on the goals set for the court in the National 
Strategy for the Processing of War Crimes Cases—National War Crimes 
Strategy.59
Even the War Crime Chamber in Sarajevo, however, cannot conduct all 
the prosecutions in Bosnia, where the National War Crimes Strategy has 
estimated the existence of tens of thousands of perpetrators.60 The goal of 
the War Crimes Strategy is to prioritize the more complex cases so that they 
are tried before the War Crimes Chamber, which has stronger witness 
protection mechanisms.61 The War Crimes Strategy emphasizes the need to 
process the most complex and highest priority war crimes cases within seven 
years, and other war crimes cases within fifteen years.62
The third level of prosecutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina is occurring 
before Cantonal Courts in the Federation, District Courts in Republika 
Srpska, and one court in the Br?ko District.63 Observer reports suggest that 
local war crimes prosecutions vary significantly in quality.64 The author has
                                                          
58. Looking for Justice:  The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, HUM. RTS.
WATCH 6 (Feb. 7, 2006), https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/02/07/looking-justice/war-crimes-chamber-
bosnia-and-herzegovina.
59. Justice in Motion, supra note 57, at 10.
60. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Shelving Justice-War Crimes Prosecutions in Paralysis, AMNESTY
INT’L, EUR 63/018/2003 (Nov. 12, 2003), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur63/018/2003/en/
.pdf.
61. National Strategy for Processing of War Crimes Cases Adopted, MINISTRY JUST. BOSNIA 
& HERZEGOVINA (Dec. 30, 2008, 2:09 PM), http://www.mpr.gov.ba/aktuelnosti/vijesti/default.aspx?
id=573&langTag=en-US [hereinafter National Strategy]; see Looking for Justice:  The War Crimes 
Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 58, at 16. 
62. National Strategy, supra note 61.  This time-table is not being met.
63. Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Local Courts Face Obstacles in War Crimes Trials, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (July 10, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/07/10/bosnia-and-herzegovina-local-
courts-face-obstacles-war-crimes-trials (“It is estimated that several thousand unresolved case files 
involving very serious crimes committed during the 1992–95 war remain that may be tried before the 
cantonal courts in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and district courts in Republika Srpka (‘the 
two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina’)”).
64. According to Human Rights Watch:
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personally met with a rape survivor who was supposed to be a “protected 
witness” in a prosecution in Republika Srpska, until her face was shown on
the evening news.65 Clearly, not all local courts are successfully 
accomplishing their work.
In Croatia, there have been war crimes prosecutions in the largest 
district courts.66 Yet, Croatia, overall, has done the fewest number of war 
crimes prosecutions.67 On the other hand, there were also the smallest 
number of crimes committed in Croatia, certainly compared to Bosnia, so 
Croatia had less to prosecute.68
In Serbia, war crimes prosecutions have occurred at the Belgrade Higher 
Court’s War Crimes Department.69 However, to date, prosecutions have 
mainly focused on lower-level and paramilitary perpetrators, rather than 
prosecuting up the chain of command, or focusing on regular or police forces 
in Serbia.70 That witness protection is run by the police71 is distinctly 
unhelpful, making it hard to imagine how any “insider” police witness could 
be effectively protected.  The “glass half-full” evaluation is that at least 
Serbia is conducting war crimes prosecutions; the “glass half-empty” 
evaluation is that it is doing a partial approach.  Even the prosecutions that 
the War Crimes Prosecutor has accomplished seem deeply unpopular with 
the majority population in Serbia, which is still unfortunately strongly 
nationalistic in outlook.72
                                                          
The obstacles include that prosecutors’ offices lack sufficient staff and generally 
do not specialize in one type of crime.  Cooperation between prosecutors and police 
and between police across entity lines continues to be problematic.  Witness 
protection measures are rarely, if ever, employed, and witness support services are 
generally not available.  Prosecutors often fail to make use of available sources of 
evidence and do not take steps necessary to secure suspect attendance at trial.  
Defense attorneys generally lack access to training in relevant areas of law and are 
often inadequately, or not at all, compensated for their work.  
Id.
65. Interview with “Protected Witness”, in Sarajevo, Bosnia (June–July 2013). 
66. Behind a Wall of Silence:  Prosecution of War Crimes in Croatia, AMNESTY INT’L (Dec. 9, 
2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur64/003/2010/en/.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 20–30.
69. BOGDAN IVANIŠEVI?, AGAINST THE CURRENT: WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS IN SERBIA 15 
(2007).
70. Id. at 16.
71. Id. at 25.
72. According to Bogdan Ivaniševi?:
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Thus, there is both tremendous progress in war crimes prosecutions in 
the former Yugoslavia, yet, much work remains to be done.
IV. THE THREE–TIERED LEVELS OF PROSECUTIONS AS A MODEL FOR THE 
FUTURE & REFLECTIONS ON JUSTICE FOR CRIMES IN SYRIA 
What the ICTY and local war crime prosecutions have provided, in 
addition to their specific prosecutorial accomplishments, is also a potential 
model for the future.  Namely, for crimes perpetrated in Bosnia, as discussed 
above, there have been three tiers of justice—the ICTY, the hybrid War 
Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo, and local courts.73 A similar three-tiered 
approach has also existed for crimes perpetrated during the Rwandan 
genocide.74 There, the ICTR prosecuted top-level perpetrators in Arusha, 
Tanzania; mid-level perpetrators were tried in domestic court trials in 
Rwanda; and the remainder were tried before the Gacaca courts in Rwanda.75
This multi-tiered approach could be a useful model when considering 
potential future justice options for any country that has suffered from large-
scale atrocity crimes.
While it is currently impossible to predict whether the war in Syria will 
end with a political solution that leaves a government, or creates a coalition 
government, willing to engage in pursuing accountability, such an outcome 
should be a goal of the international community and people of Syria, so that 
justice for the mass atrocity crimes that have been perpetrated and are being 
                                                          
[I]t seems that the contribution of the trials to increasing public acceptance of the 
facts of war crimes is still limited.  For example, although one in three respondents 
was familiar with the allegations that Kosovo Albanians were victims of expulsion 
during the NATO bombing campaign, only [fifteen] percent of the respondents 
believed them.
Id. at 36.  Troublingly, the post of War Crimes Prosecutor is now vacant.
73. About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2017); Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Courts Face
Obstacles in War Crimes Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 10, 2008, 8:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2008/07/10/bosnia-and-herzegovina-local-courts-face-obstacles-war-crimes-trials; Justice at Risk:
War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Oct. 13, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/icty1004.pdf.
74. The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS,
http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
75. Rwanda: Justice After Genocide—20 Years on, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 2014, 6:02 
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-genocide-20-years (discussing the 
different levels of justice—ICTR, domestic trials, and gacaca).
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perpetrated there by multiple sides76 may be systematically addressed 
through a credible tribunal or set of tribunals.
At present, the International Criminal Court (ICC)77 has no jurisdiction 
to prosecute the bulk of the crimes occurring in Syria, as Syria is not a State 
Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute,78 and Russia and China have vetoed U.N. 
Security Council referral of the situation to the ICC.79 As a result, currently, 
the Court only has limited jurisdiction, over foreign fighters in Syria who hail 
from Rome Statute States Parties.80 But even if full ICC jurisdiction existed, 
the ICC usually prosecutes only a handful of persons in any one situation 
country.81 That simply would not suffice for the kind of crime scenes 
occurring in Syria—for instance, where up to an estimated 1400 died in one 
chemical weapons attack alone in 2013.82 Thus, when there is a different 
political outcome in Syria that will allow the pursuit of justice,83 there will 
be a need for a tribunal, or multiple levels of tribunals, to adjudicate mass 
atrocity crimes committed on all sides, and, ideally, the top level tribunal—
whether fully international or a hybrid tribunal—should resemble the ICTY 
in terms of capacity.  This should be our model from which to draw upon for 
crimes committed in Syria, or any other country in the future that faces mass 
atrocity crimes where a combination of ICC prosecutions and local court 
                                                          
76. For findings on atrocity crimes perpetrated in Syria, see, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. Indep. Int’l 
Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic on Its Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc A/HRC/30/48 (2015).
77. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
78. For a listing of the States Parties to the ICC, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute,
INT’L CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%
20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
79. UN Bid to Refer Syria to ICC Vetoed, AL JAZEERA (May 23, 2014, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/05/un-bid-refer-syria-icc-vetoed-20145221427105746
65.html.
80. See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accountability for Crimes in Syria and Iraq 
(Including ICC Jurisdiction Over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 12, 2014, 8:59 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-
foreign-fighters/.
81. There are currently twenty-three cases at the ICC, involving nine situation countries.  See
Situations Under Investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations
%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017); 23 Cases, INT’L
CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
82. Joby Warrick, More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says,
WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-
killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650f
d5_story.html?utm_term=.ed9abab98303.
83. Voluntary accession to the Rome Statute by Syria, or consent to the creation of an 
international or hybrid tribunal, or a specialized war crimes chamber in Syria, would all require a different 
Syrian government than the present one.
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capacity84 cannot reasonably be expected to credibly handle the bulk of 
prosecutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The ICTY has made significant accomplishments in the justice it has 
rendered and in its jurisprudence, but, overall, has also left us with a three-
tiered model for international justice, with the existence of:  the ICTY, the 
War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo, and local courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
While not all have functioned perfectly, this vision of three-tiers of justice 
can serve as a model for the future.  As we someday, hopefully, contemplate 
how to achieve justice for crimes occurring in Syria, it is a useful model from 
which the international community should draw.  While the ICTY’s
existence has not transformed society in Bosnia, it was never reasonable to 
think a tribunal could do so.  Twenty-one years after the Srebrenica massacre, 
there may be an unhappy peace that exists between the two entities in Bosnia, 
and also between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in the Cantons within 
the Federation, but it should now be for the people of the region to own this 
legacy and create a more enduring solution themselves.  Ultimately, it is hard 
to imagine any prosecutions occurring in the region, but for the creation of 
the ICTY.
                                                          
84. Local prosecutions can include use of a specialized chamber such as the International 
Crimes Division of the High Court in Uganda.  See Janet Anderson, Harriet Ssali Lule: “What Matters
is That There Are Victims”, JUST. HUB (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:10), https://justicehub.org/article/harriet-ssali-
lule-what-matters-there-are-victims; International Crimes Division, JUDICIARY: REPUBLIC OF UGANDA,
http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/smenu/18/International%20Crimes%20Division.html (last visited Mar. 
13, 2017).  In July 2008, the Government of Uganda established the International Crimes Division to try 
individuals alleged to have committed international crimes during the 20-year insurgency in northern 
Uganda. Anderson, supra; see also Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts Uganda’s 
International Crimes Division, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Jan. 2012, at 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Africa is changing rapidly and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular 
represents the region with the fastest growing population in the world, 
abounding with young people yearning for opportunities and change.1 Yet, 
this region also harbors many of the longest sitting presidents in the world, 
each accumulating more than thirty years at the helmet.2 From Angola to 
Zimbabwe, from Rwanda to the Congo, state leaders cling to power, often 
                                                          
? The author is a Visiting Scholar at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Faculty of Law, 
at the University of Oslo and Co-Chair of the European Society of International Law Interest Group on 
Migration and Refugee Law.  He has previously served at the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board and 
taught at the University of Oslo and at Boston University as a Lecturer in International Law and Visiting 
Fulbright Scholar.
1. Andrews Atta-Asamoah & Jean-Michel Severino, Head-to-head:  Is Africa’s Young 
Population a Risk or an Asset?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
25869838.
2. Jason Hanna, Africa’s Current Longest-Serving Leaders, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/19/africa/africa-gambia-longest-serving-leaders/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017, 3:13 PM).
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employing less than democratic techniques—from questionable referenda 
and flagrant constitutional amendments to flawed elections and excessive use 
of force—all with a view to defying the rules of democratic alternation, 
pushing people to succumb or leave. What are the inherent reasons for these 
state leaders’ behavior, why do they still succeed, what are the consequences 
for those voicing opposition, and what role is there to be played by 
international law in contributing to curtailing these seemingly unbounded 
and perpetual presidencies—or is the alternative worse?
This paper aims at highlighting some of the most notorious cases of 
close to unlimited governance, discussing underlying reasons for the status 
quo and potential contributions international law may offer in terms of 
safeguarding the human rights of the population and inducing a path towards 
democratic alternation. On a related level, the article sets out to demonstrate 
that the approach taken thus far towards African countries by international—
particularly European—actors with a view to stemming the flow of refugees 
and irregular migrants coming to their borders is shortsighted at best, if not 
utterly misconceived, even if moral considerations were to be set aside. As 
both the lack of prospects of democratic alternation and migration are 
interrelated, it is argued that only by addressing the former head-on, may the 
demand or need for the latter be sustainably reduced.
Hence, after exemplifying the systemic problem of bad governance by 
depicting a number of pertinent cases with similar traits of character situated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper will regard the ensuing consequences of 
this state of affairs through the lenses of refugee law—prior to discussing the 
various steps taken in particular by European actors in reaction to these 
consequences. Recognizing that addressing the causes of irregular migration 
is necessary, but far from sufficient, the ensuing section will point to 
underlying root causes as the explanans of refugee and migratory flows, and 
look for ways to tackle those root causes.
II. BACKDROP SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, represents the region with the 
youngest and fastest growing population in the world, yet also consists of
many of the poorest countries on the globe.3 At the same time, a number of 
the longest-sitting state leaders display various common traits, aimed at 
resisting democratic alternation, including flawed referenda, hasty 
constitutional amendments, political violence, and other forms of exclusion,
thus resulting in some instances in a lack of alternation over the course of 
                                                          
3. Mark Anderson, Sub-Saharan Africa’s Youth Population Offers “Enormous Potential”,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/18/subsaharan-
africa-youth-population-potential.
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more than thirty years.4 Several countries which are negatively concerned in 
that way will be depicted below, in a geographical fashion, traveling from 
east to west.
A. Angola
Angola adopted a new constitution in 2010, opening for the sitting 
president, José Eduardo dos Santos, to ultimately sit for another ten years at 
the helmet, despite having accumulated already more than three decades in 
power.5 Historically, the head of the majority party automatically assumes 
the presidency, which, in real and democratic contests elsewhere is neither 
unusual, nor particularly questionable.6 Consequently, in a country 
dominated by one party, controlled by one strongman, it effectively leads to 
a freeze in alternation. To be true, the Constitution which, in many other 
regards conveys the impression, at first sight, of epitomizing human rights 
protection and modern division of power,7 also includes a clause according 
to which the president may be removed by parliament.8 But for this removal 
to happen, the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, respectively, needs to 
approve, and all judges of these Courts are and have been appointed by the
President.9 Furthermore, while the Constitution states that the president’s
term shall last for five years, and fixes the maximum length in office to two 
terms,10 rendering former presidents who have already served two terms of 
office ineligible for election11 and declaring constitutional referenda 
impermissible,12 these are only ostensible hindrances. The president or one 
third of the members of the National Assembly may initiate a revision of the 
Constitution,13 which requires only a two-thirds majority in Parliament,14 and
would become effective without a grace period, such as an election cycle.
The enumeration of material limits to constitutional alternations is rather 
                                                          
4. Ken Opalo, Term Limits and Democratic Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Lesson 
from Burundi, CONSTITUTIONNET (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-and-
democratic-consolidation-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-burundi.
5. Celia W. Dugger, Angola Moves to Make President Stronger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/world/africa/22angola.html.
6. Id.
7. CONSTITUTION art. 2, §§ 1–2 (2010) (Angl.).
8. Id. at art. 161(m).
9. Id. at art. 129, §§ 3–5.
10. Id. at art. 113, §§ 1–2.
11. Id. at art. 110, §§ 1–2(a–h).
12. CONSTITUTION art. 168, § 3 (2010) (Angl.).
13. Id. at art. 233.
14. Id. at art. 235, § 2.
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vague, and is silent with respect to term limits.15 Constitutional inertia or 
other constitutional safeguards thus appear to be largely absent.
B. Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)
In the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the sitting president 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, already reigning for a total of more than thirty-two 
years, aimed at preserving his grip on power by changing the Constitution of 
2002.16 This Constitution stated that no one may be president for more than 
two consecutive terms,17 and no one aged seventy years or more may be
eligible to stand for office.18 Sassou-Nguesso would, even if one were to 
start the count of years after the 2002 constitution came into force, have 
exceeded his term limits in 2016, and he had already turned seventy-two 
years of age.19 Hence, Sassou-Nguesso pushed through a referendum in the 
fall of 2015 with a view to changing those pertinent constitutional limitations, 
intimidated the opposition—which eventually boycotted the referendum—
and claimed a more than ninety percent approval rate for the constitutional 
amendment.20 The fact that voter turnout was probably below five percent,
did not bother him. Apparently, no minimum participation seems to be 
required.21 Based on those results, the Constitution was changed, now 
removing presidential age-limitations,22 and opening for three presidential 
terms.23 Sassou-Nguesso thus claimed eligibility for yet another term.24
There were elections held with widespread repression and documented 
electoral fraud, most opposition candidates were jailed or fled the country, 
                                                          
15. See id. at art. 236.
16. Congo backs Sassou Nguesso Third-Term Bid by Landslide, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34646310.
17. CONSTITUTION art. 57 (2002) (Congo) (the Constitution was drafted in 2001, but adopted 
following a referendum held on Jan. 20, 2002); cf. CONSTITUTION art. 65 (2015) (Congo) (comparing that 
at that time, the term length was still seven years though).
18. CONSTITUTION art. 58 (2002) (Congo).
19. Grace Magu, Congo to Vote on Extending the Two Term Presidential Limit, FAMILY.TODAY 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://familynews.today/congo-to-vote-on-extending-the-two-termpresidentiallimitp1277-
153.htm.
20. Congo-Brazzaville:  92% Des Électeurs Pour Une Nouvelle Constitution, RFI (Nov. 27, 
2015), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151027-congo-brazzaville-92-electeurs-favorables-nouvelle-constitut
ion.
21. Id.
22. Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 66 (2015) (Congo).
23. Id. at art. 65 (distinguishing that the only concession was that presidential terms henceforth 
would last for five instead of seven years).
24. Congo-Brazzaville:  Referendum Passes Allowing President to Extend Rule, ALLAFRICA
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201510270558.html.
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and Sassou-Nguesso proclaimed himself winner.25 Apart from flagrant 
violations even of established legal and constitutional provisions, no 
constitutional inertia or other constitutional safeguards26 exist against what 
James Madison once described as the danger of arbitrary government and the 
current mores of oppressive majorities, or, as here, oppression itself.27
C. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Meanwhile, a similar attempt at extending the constitutionally 
prescribed term limits occurred in neighboring DRC, where the sitting 
president Joseph Kabila’s second and last reelection term was up in 
November 2016.28 Unable to push constitutional changes regarding 
presidential term limits directly through, which, according to Article 220 of 
the Constitution of 2006, could not be the object of revision,29 he opted for a 
subtle twist: the ‘glissement’, or ‘slip’.30 The argument goes as follows, 
according to Article 70 of the Constitution,31 the president remains in power 
until elections of a new president have been concluded.32 Hence, as long as 
no new elections have taken place, which the current regime seems to do 
everything to prevent, Kabila shall remain in power.33 Maximizing on this 
vague definition, the president and his followers seem to have done 
                                                          
25. Edward McAllister, EU and U.S. Condemn Post-Election Violence in Republic of Congo,
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-idUSKCN0X5
1BV.
26. E.g., CONSTITUTION art. 85 (2015) (Congo) (requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament
and/or the coming into force of any constitutional amendments not until after an ensuing parliament has 
been elected). The president and members of parliament have a concurrent right to propose constitutional 
revisions.  If the president initiates a revision, and the Supreme Court (whose members according to art. 
172 are appointed for life by the president) does not object, the revision proposal may directly be submitted 
to a referendum.  Hence, also the provisions of the Constitution of 2015 hardly qualify as constitutional 
safeguards properly so called, see CONSTITUTION art. 172, 241 (2015) (Congo).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
28. Maud Jullien, DR Congo President Unlikely to Give Up Power, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35072001.
29. Compare id. (the current president is suspected of staying in power past his presidential 
term) with CONSTITUTION art. 70, 220 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo) (the length and number of presidential 
terms may not be changed, and hence are fixed according to art. 70 to a five-year term, renewable once).
30. William Clowes, DR Congo’s Joseph Kabila is Taking a Slippery Path to a Third Term,
QUARTZ AFR. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://qz.com/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-
to-a-third-term/.
31. CONSTITUTION art. 70, § 2 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
32. Id.
33. Cf. Xavier Monnier, L’art de Retarder Les Élections en RDC, Raconté Par l’un de Ses 
Stratèges, LE MONDE (July 15, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/07/18/l-art-
de-retarder-les-elections-en-rdc-raconte-par-l-un-de-ses-strateges_4971074_3212.html.
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everything to render the timely organization of elections even logistically 
impossible.34 Demonstrations in support of respecting the constitution, 
organizing elections, and requesting the president to respect the term limits, 
were met with force, resulting in at least fifty-three deaths and several 
hundred arbitrary arrests.35 When the opposition denounced such 
interpretation as unconstitutional, and even appealed to the Constitutional 
Court, the Court voted in favor of the president’s view.36 However, as it 
turned out, the Constitutional Court’s judgment was unconstitutional itself 
even if judged by its own standards and legal basis.37 The Constitutional 
Court consists of nine judges, seven are needed for a quorum, but only five 
were actually present—some had excused themselves as sick, others had left 
the country.38 Meanwhile, the stalemate continued and it was only when the 
National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO)39 intervened that some 
negotiations between opposition and governing party occurred, with a view 
to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The talks under the aegis of 
CENCO eventually yielded an agreement, under the terms of which
presidential elections were to be held by the end of 2017, at which time at the 
latest president Kabila was to resign definitely, the opposition was to get to 
choose the prime minster, and the head of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (CENI)40 supervising the preparations for the long-overdue 
elections.41 However, solution of remaining points of discord and, above all, 
implementation of the terms of the agreement, have come to an impasse, with 
the governing party continuing what appear to be stalling tactics.  And with 
every day that passes, CENCO is more likely to discontinue offering its good 
offices, and preparations for the envisioned presidential election before the 
end of the year—the paramount precondition of the agreement—less likely 
to see the light of day. The recent death of Etienne Tshisekedi, the historical,
                                                          
34. Id.
35. Cf. Violences de Septembre en RDC:  L’ONU Accuse Les Forces de Sécurité, RFI: AFRIQUE
(Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161021-violences-septembre-rdc-forces-ordre-accusees-onu.
36. David Kode, Movement Builds to Stop Congo’s President from Postponing Election,
WAGINGNONVIOLENCE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2016), http://wagingnonviolence.org/2016/12/congo-kabila-post
pone-election/.
37. RDC:  Les Juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle à Couteaux Tirés, RFI: AFRIQUE (Nov. 4, 
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161104-rdc-juges-cour-constitutionnelle-couteaux-tires.
38. Id.
39. Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO).
40. Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI).
41. Cf. RDC:  Signature de l'Accord Par la Majorité et l'Opposition, RFI: AFRIQUE (Dec. 31, 
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161231-rdc-majorite-opposition-cenco-kabila-joseph-eveques.
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most respected and uniting opposition figure, designated as head of CENI for 
the period of transition, does not bode well for the further process.42
D. Rwanda
Also, Rwanda has seen increasing repression and a decreasing political 
space over the past few years.43 Long hailed as an exemplary country in a 
Sub-Saharan, and post-violence context, and strategically playing the 
‘genocide card’ whenever criticism towards human rights abuses at the hand 
of the government mounted, the political situation in the country has adopted 
most of the traits of a one-party state.44 There seems to exist no real 
opposition to Paul Kagame, and claims to the contrary, such as pointing to 
the so-called ‘Green Party’, the only registered and authorized opposition 
party, appear to be a means of paying lip service to foreign donors.45 A recent 
attempted visit by a foreign reporter demonstrated that the ‘Green Party’ was 
barely visible in the streets, even its headquarters were hard to find, and 
hardly staffed.46 In such an environment, Kagame pushed through a 
referendum for a constitutional amendment removing the limitation of sitting 
for a maximum of two terms as president.47 Taking a climate of repression 
and control, reports of forced voting, and insufficient time to even debate the 
amendments to the constitution into account, it is probably not surprising that 
the majority of Rwandans approved these changes, now effectively allowing 
Kagame to stay on for a total of more than thirty years.48 But is a 
constitutional amendment, even if approved by a large majority, valid in such
a context? The idiosyncratic nature of the constitutional amendment,49
                                                          
42. Cf. Mort de Tshisekedi en RDC:  Quel Impact Sur le Dialogue Politique?, RFI: AFRIQUE 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170202-mort-tshisekedi-rdc-quel-impact-le-dialogue-politi
que.
43. Omar S. McDoom, To Aid, or Not to Aid?  The Case of Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS U. (Apr. 
29, 2013), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html.
44. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda:  Progress or Powder Keg?, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 19, 22 (2015); 
World Bank:  Economic Growth in Africa Down to 1.6 pct, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.
dailysabah.com/economy/2016/10/04/world-bank-economic-growth-in-africa-down-to-16-pct.
45. Bruno Meyerfeld, Au Rwanda, Les Opposants se Font Discrets, LE MONDE (Aug. 9, 2016, 
11:41 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/08/09/au-rwanda-les-opposants-se-fontdis
crets_4980295_3210.html.
46. Id.
47. Jesko Johannsen, Rwandans Head to Polls in Controversial Referendum, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/rwandans-head-to-polls-in-controversial-referendum/a-
18922926.
48. Id.
49. Cf. Filip Reyntjens, The Changes Made to Rwanda’s Constitution are Peculiar—Here’s 
Why, CONVERSATION (Jan. 28, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://theconversation.com/the-changes-made-torwandas
-constitution-are-peculiar-heres-why-53771.
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tailored to one person only, Kagame, has been criticized for undermining 
democratic change of government contrary also to article 23 of the African 
Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance, which states that “illegal 
means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional 
change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the African 
Union (AU).”50
E. Burundi
The final examples of bad governance in this belt of African Great 
Lakes countries pertains to Burundi, where the sitting president, Pierre 
Nkurunziza, pushed through a disputed third mandate, claiming that the term 
limits applied only to a president who, as required by the constitution, was 
elected ‘by the people’, i.e. “by universal direct suffrage.”51 However, 
Nkurunzizas first term came about through negotiations following the peace 
agreements that ended the civil war in Burundi, and hence he was elected by 
Parliament then, not by the people.52 But instead of having an open political 
dialogue, as in the countries depicted above, a similar pattern of repression 
and political violence emerged, where even judges on the Constitutional 
Court apparently had been pressured to decide the question, raised by the 
opposition, of an unconstitutional extension of term limits, as in line with the 
president’s view.53 At least one of these judges soon afterwards fled the 
country and reportedly applied for asylum.54
Furthermore, Burundi has in recent months refused to cooperate with 
the United Nations (U.N.), including giving a group of experts, among them
the AUs Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), access to continue their independent 
investigations into the security and human rights situation in the country.55
                                                          
50. Cf. Ivan R. Mugisha, EU Questions Constitutional Amendment in Rwanda, E. AFR. (Dec. 4, 
2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EU-questions-constitutional-amendmentin
Rwanda/2558-2984382-gb8oyt/index.html.
51. Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2005) (Burundi).
52. Morgan Winsor, Burundi Elections 2015:  President Nkurunziza Should Withdraw Third 
Term Bid, Former Leader Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 4, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
burundi-elections-2015-president-nkurunziza-should-withdraw-third-term-bid-former-1907861.
53. Edmund Kagire, Exiled Burundian Judge Sylvere Nimpagaritse Speaks Out, E. AFR. (May 
7, 2015, 8:31 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Exiled-Burundian-judge-SylvereNimpagaritse
-speaks-out/-/2558/2709602/-/j3371vz/-/index.html.
54. See id.
55. Matthew Russell Lee, From Burundi, UN Human Rights Experts Banned, Unable to Deploy, 
OHCHR Says, INNER CITY PRESS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.innercity
press.com/burundi237banthirdterm012616.html; Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, 
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
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Based on what the experts had seen and researched thus far, the United 
Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) report stated, inter 
alia, that there were serious reasons for believing that “gross human rights 
violations [which may] amount to crimes against humanity” may have been 
committed.56 The report was published in September 2016.57 A few weeks 
later, the Burundian government announced that it would withdraw from the 
International Criminal Court (ICC),58 the sole international court with 
jurisdiction over international crimes, including crimes against humanity,
without limitations in terms of temporal or geographical scope, or official 
capacity of the accused, for example as head of state or government.59
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAD GOVERNANCE
What the above countries have in common is that wherever possible, 
they tried to at least give the impression of paying heed to constitutional 
rules, basing changes to term limits or other constitutional provisions 
benefitting the president and the ruling party on constitutional provisions 
presumably allowing just that—without regard to the context and form in 
which such changes could be regarded as legitimate. That some of these 
provisions even opened for certain term extensions and other revisions that 
may benefit the very government proposing the changes, without the 
common constitutional safeguards of e.g. at least one electoral period 
between the suggested revision and the coming into force of such changes, 
may be regarded as a flaw in itself. But combined with an environment of 
repression and abuse of power, precluding any meaningful political 
opposition to the ruling party and discussion of the proposed changes, the 
various modes of constitutional amendments may hardly be described as 
legitimate from an objective point of view60—they would often more 
appropriately be called constitutional coups d’état.
                                                          
http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
56. Cf. Rep. of the U.N. Indep. Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) on Its Thirty-Third Session, 
U.N. Doc S-24/1, at 14 (2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the UNIIB].
57. Id.
58. See Burundi:  ICC Withdrawal Major Loss to Victims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2016, 
12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims.
59. Other international courts with similar subject matter jurisdiction, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) had their competences restricted in geographical (cf. ICTY Statute, art. 1) or temporal (cf. ICTR 
Statute, art. 1) scope.  
60. See Democratic Republic of Congo:  Background and U.S. Relations, EVERYCRS
REPORT.COM (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43166.html.
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Also, quite telling when it comes to the disregard of the true 
(teleological) meaning of constitutional provisions are the lack of respect 
paid to other, less visible provisions, or, more precisely, the creative 
inventions in order to hide unconstitutional behavior. Article 96 of the 
constitution of the DRC for example prohibits the president to be involved in 
any professional activity during his terms in office, though not his family.61
Recent research revealed that Joseph Kabila’s family had an interest in, and 
often controlled, at least seventy companies, in almost any sector of 
importance, from banking to agriculture, from petroleum and mining to 
transportation and hotel business, in the DRC but also abroad, resulting in 
contracts worth several hundred million dollars.62 Joseph Kabila himself is 
associated directly only with two of these companies.63 But there seems to 
be little doubt as to the origin of all the other family contracts, and even 
Kabila’s diplomatic adviser, Barnabe Kikaya Bin Karubi, is quoted as
trivializing the results of that research by stating that there is nothing unusual 
about the members of Kabila’s family having some advantages—after all, 
it’s the presidential family.64
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the population strata, context of 
suppression and meager outlook for improvement, many, and especially 
young, people flee, migrate, or otherwise try to leave the area of conflict, and 
move to neighboring areas or even beyond, seeking protection.65
A. Refugees and Migrants
While there is no universally accepted legal definition of migration, and 
hence of ‘irregular’ or ‘forced migrants’, the latter are sometimes referred to 
as “persons [either not having applied] for asylum [yet or] asylum seekers 
                                                          
61. CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
62. Michael Kavanagh, Thomas Wilson & Franz Wild, With His Family’s Fortune at Stake, 
President Kabila Digs In, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2016-12-15/with-his-family-fortune-at-stake-congo-president-kabila-digs-in.
63. See id.
64. See RDC:  Bloomberg Révèle l’Empire Économique Bâti Par la Famille Kabila, RFI (Dec. 
16, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161216-rdc-agence-bloomberg-revele-empire-economique-bati-
famille-kabila-president.
65. Lucy Beck & Leo Dobbs ed., On the Run, Alone and Young:  Congolese Children Flee to 
Uganda, UNHCR (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/2/5113b67b6/run-alone-young-
congolese-children-flee-uganda.html; Esther Yu His Lee, The Huge Refugee Crisis That’s Already 
Displaced 220,000 People, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-huge-refugee-
crisis-thats-already-displaced-220-000-people-71e96cbb5ea0#.t1hiv48np.
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whose applications [were deemed] inadmissible.”66 The terms refugees and 
migrants are often used interchangeably, not least in public and popular, and 
certainly in populist discourse, and should be kept apart, especially when 
discussing rights attached to the respective status.67 However, for the 
purpose of the ensuing discussion, ‘irregular migration’ may be used to 
encompass (often large) movements of refugees and migrants alike, as the 
focus will be on the act of fleeing or migrating, not on the legal status 
eventually sought, received, or denied. IDPs on the other hand could be 
described as inhibited refugees, potentially having suffered the same 
persecution as ‘conventional refugees’, but not having been able to cross an
international border.68 Hence, they are unfortunately easily overlooked as,
alas, also here not directly relevant to this article.
Whether one employs the European Union (EU) definition of a refugee 
included in EU Qualification Directive 2011/95, the 1969 Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) definition, or in the United States, section 101(a)(42) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), they are all based on the 1951 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee 
Convention as the common framework.69
“Refugee” means a third-country national who, 
                                                          
66. Press Release, European Commission, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement—
Questions and Answers, RAPID 16/1221 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Implementing the EU-Turkey 
Agreement].
67. ‘Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’–Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), UNHCR (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-ques
tions-faqs.html; Joshua Keating, The Difference Between Refugee and Migrant Matters, SLATEST (Aug. 
28, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/28/the_terms_migrant_and_
refugee_should_not_be_used_interchangeably_the_difference.html.
68. Key Migration Terms, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/key-migration-
terms (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2016); Council Directive 337/9, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 13 (EU); G.A. 
Res. 429 (V), at 48 (Dec. 14, 1950); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM & PEOPLES’ RTS. (Sept. 10, 1969), http://www.achpr.org
/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf.
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owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion, [or membership of 
a particular social group,] is outside the country of nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear . . . is unwilling to avail himself 
[or herself] of the protection of that country; or [a stateless person]
who, . . . being outside [of] the country of his [or her] former 
habitual residence [for the same reasons as mentioned above,] is 
unable or, owing to such fear, . . . is unwilling to return to it . . . .70
Additionally, so-called subsidiary protection may be available to a 
person who does not qualify as a refugee but “in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned 
. . . would face a real risk of suffering serious harm . . . .”71
B. The Drivers of Irregular Migration
As had been stated e.g. in the aforementioned UNIIB report, but is valid, 
mutatis mutandis, across the countries discussed above, and beyond the Sub-
Saharan region, the civil war in Burundi that ended in 2005 had a devastating 
effect on the economy and living standards.72 Following the Arusha 
Agreement, Burundi experienced a period of some stability and sustainable 
growth.73 The political crisis now, however, is reversing such progress.74
The climate of violence and repression has disrupted economic activity.75
Half of the youth are estimated to be unemployed and the majority of the 
demonstrators against the third presidential mandate were disenchanted 
youth.76 Their high numbers may also provide a large source of recruitment 
for nascent rebel and other armed opposition movements.77 But the latter is 
just one additional concern as to what neglected or not appropriately dealt 
with crises situations may lead to, also potentially regarding countries outside 
the region, including overseas.  However, as far as refugee and other 
migration flows are concerned, the UNIIB investigations clearly “confirmed 
                                                          
70. G. A. Res. 429 (V), supra note 69, at 48.
71. María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to Be Granted 
Asylum Under EC Law, 136 NEW ISSUES REFUGEE RES. (UNHCR) 1, 11 (Nov. 20, 2006).
72. See Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 14.
73. Id. at 14–15.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 15. Employment here includes any kind of work, not 
just work on a regular salary, which anyways pertains to only a tiny fraction of the work force.
77. Cf. Id.
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the impact of the political crisis on the massive outflow” of people.78 It is 
also in line with common patterns of drivers of migration.
In general terms, drivers of migration consist of push and pull factors.79
Push factors include armed conflict, in particular prolonged armed conflict, 
where Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, but not least the conflict-ridden eastern part 
of the DRC would be prime examples.80 Another strong, contributing push 
factor is the political crisis, with, usually, concomitant political violence—as 
is currently taking place throughout the Sub-Saharan region.81 As
exemplified above, political crisis often carries with it situations of 
generalized or indiscriminate violence, individual insecurity, high 
unemployment, economic breakdown, sometimes additionally driven by 
natural disasters, utter lack of opportunity, and a sense of hopelessness.
These factors are often interrelated.
Pull factors often, but not always, represent the mirror image of push 
factors, with protection, political freedom, security, access to health (care), 
etc., looming large on the list.82
As may be seen, there is some reciprocity among push and pull factors.
Also, not all of these factors are related to or limited to ‘refugees’.
IV. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) for the 
first time in the so-called New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
explicitly acknowledged a connection between crises situations, the rule of 
law, or lack thereof, as well as marginalization, exclusion and the lack of 
development and large movements of refugees and migrants.83 The GA
pledged to “work with countries of origin to strengthen their capacities.”84
Furthermore,
                                                          
78 Id.
79. Migration Push/Pull Factors, APHG CLASS WIKI (Jan. 9, 2016, 10:45 PM), http://lewis
historicalsociety.com/wiki2011/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=28.
80. See, e.g., Root Causes of Migration—Fact Sheet, ONE AM., https://www.weareoneamerica
.org/root-causes-migration-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
81. The Sub-Saharan Security Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/africa-
sub-saharan/sub-saharan-security-tracker/p37884 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
82. See Migration Push/Pull Factors, supra note 79.
83. Draft for Adoption, U.N. (July 29, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/popula
tion/migration/events/ga/documents/2016/1August2016/Outcome_Declaration.pdf; Press Release, 
U.N., New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants Adopted by all Member States at Historic UN 
Summit, U.N. Press Release (Sept. 19, 2016).
84. G.A. Res. A/71/1, ¶ 12 (Oct. 3, 2016).
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[r]ecognizing that armed conflict, persecution and violence, 
including terrorism, are among the factors which give rise to large 
refugee movements . . . [the signatories stated their intention] to 
address the root causes of such crisis situations and to prevent or 
resolve conflict by peaceful means [and to] work in every way 
possible for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prevention of 
conflict and the achievement of the long-term political solutions 
required.85
Acknowledging further that “[t]he promotion of human rights is also 
critical,” the GA declared: “In addition, we will promote good governance, 
the rule of law, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions . . . .”86
It remains to be seen what may come of such a GA Declaration, non-
legally binding as it is in character. Furthermore, while some of the ideas 
expressed herein are laudable, there is reason to be concerned that the core 
of the problem, here only stated as an addendum, as will be argued below, 
will be overlooked or so vaguely defined as to be lost out of sight.
The current, prevailing way of addressing refugee flows may be 
exemplified by the region experiencing an unprecedented increase in people 
from the aforementioned and other crisis regions, including Syria, coming to 
their door steps, and applying for protection or other rights of stay. In order 
to stem the flow of new arrivals, the EU concluded an agreement with 
Turkey, one of the main countries through which migrants and refugees to 
Europe would travel, essentially offering money for border control, and 
tightened frontiers.87
                                                          
85. Id. at ¶ 64.
86. Id.
87. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, as United Nations, International Organization for Migration Sign Key Agreement, U.N. Press 
Release GA/11820 (Sept. 19, 2016).
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Under the terms of the deal, all new ‘irregular migrants’—defined 
as persons either not having applied for asylum or asylum-seekers 
whose applications were deemed inadmissible—crossing from 
Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey. In other 
words, for every returned Syrian (the largest group of ‘irregular 
migrants’), another Syrian would be resettled to the EU from 
Turkey directly. In addition, Turkey promised to “take any 
necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes from Turkey 
to the EU.” In exchange, the EU would allocate [three] billion
[euros] under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, with an 
additional [three] billion [euros] to be mobilized by the end of 
2018. Lastly, and perhaps the main motivating factor for Ankara 
to enter into this accord, the EU promised an accelerated process 
to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens.
In parallel proceedings, the EU is also pushing ahead with a 
migrant pact on Africa, offering similar incentives—a share in the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—to a number of African 
countries in exchange for stemming the flow of potential refugees 
to Europe.  The deal, already deemed “morally unacceptable” by 
several human rights organizations, may also be questionable on 
legal grounds.
Both the EU-Turkey and EU-Africa agreements include the 
contribution of large sums of money to enhance the situation for 
refugees already in the respective regions by creating employment 
and development programs. Although this approach addresses 
some of the root causes of migration, the problem is that it relies 
heavily on partners that, at least in part, have a rather dubious track 
record when it comes to the protection of human rights. These 
regimes, due to their repressive nature, represent the very reason a 
number of bona fides refugees try to leave.88
And looking at examples from the recent past should suffice as a 
reminder to tread carefully.
                                                          
88. Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement, supra note 66; Susan M. Akram & Tom Syring, 
Needed in Europe:  A Comprehensive Plan of Action on Refugees, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/
files/documents/IRLIGblog_AkramSyring.docx (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter A Comprehensive 
Plan of Action on Refugees]; see also Human Rights Organizations Slam New EU-Africa Migrant Pact,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 29, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/human-rights-organizations-slamneweu
africamigrantpact/a19365407?mc_cid=c9b2922399&mc_eid=1ca8e5dc24%20; Jeanne Park, Europe’s 
Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europes-
migration-crisis/p32874 (last modified Sept. 23, 2015); see generally European Commission Press 
Release RAPID 15/6056, A European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (Nov. 12, 2015); European 
Commission Press Release RAPID 15/5597, Refugee Crisis: European Commission Takes Decisive 
Action—Questions and Answers (Sept. 9, 2015); The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, EUR.
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Prior to the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi, Italy and Libya 
reportedly executed an agreement that compensated Libya in return for 
cracking down on illegal migration routes stemming from, or in any case 
leading through, Libya.89 That agreement included an opening for Italian 
authorities to swiftly return intercepted boat migrants to Libya—a country 
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention—before they could 
even reach Italian shores.90 The agreement was criticized for not sufficiently 
differentiating between illegal migrants and genuine refugees, and in many 
cases not even having the necessary procedures in place for making a well-
informed decision in regard to refugee status determinations of the people 
intercepted at sea before they were returned.91
                                                          
COMMISSION: INT’L COOPERATION & DEV., http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-
trust-fund-africa_en (last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Turkey Warns EU:  Visa Deal or No Migrant Pact,
MIDDLE E. EYE (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-warns-eu-visa-
deal-or-no-migrant-accord-866776688.
89. See Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 21, 2009)
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around-0 [hereinafter Pushed Back]; see 
also Italy to Pay Libya $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/
world/europe/31iht-italy.4.15774385.html [hereinafter Italy to Pay]. 
90. Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89.
91. Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89. 
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In the 2012 case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,92 the European 
Court of Human Rights, again sitting as a Grand Chamber, 
reiterated the gist of the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece,
and observed that “Libya’s failure to comply with its international 
obligations was one of the facts denounced in the international 
reports of that country.  In any event, . . . the existence of domestic 
laws and the ratification of international treaties guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental rights [as in said bilateral agreement 
between Italy and Libya] are not in themselves sufficient to ensure 
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in 
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted 
to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to 
the principles of the Convention . . . .  Italy cannot evade its own 
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral 
agreements with Libya.”93
The Court therefore unanimously held there had been a violation 
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the 
part of Italy by exposing the applicants to the risk of being 
subjected to ill-treatment in Libya and to being repatriated to 
Somalia and Eritrea, the respective applicants’ home countries 
from which they had fled.94
Concerns have also been raised that readmission agreements, even 
where their conclusion would not be contrary per se to any 
provisions of international law, contribute to potential violations 
of refugee rights, including the denial of access to protection due 
to the accelerated procedures of expulsion which generally form 
part of such accords.95 Paying-off and redirecting refugee flows 
in that fashion to countries less concerned with, or feeling less 
bound by, the Refugee Convention—and the granting of rights 
pronounced therein—jeopardizes the fairness of the asylum 
system and thus the very idea underlying the concept of granting 
protection to those in need.96
Hence, the EU should think carefully about not entering into new, 
similar, potentially abusive, if not outright illegal, agreements—whether 
under the guise of development aid or other cooperation.
                                                          
92. See Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, (No. 27765), Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2012); see also Tom 
Syring, The Sirens and the Emperor:  The European Union Between Attraction and Intervention, in STILL 
WAITING FOR TOMORROW: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF UNRESOLVED REFUGEE CRISES 269 (Susan
Akram & Tom Syring ed., 2014).
93. Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, (No. 27765), Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2012).
94. Syring, supra, note 92.
95. Id.; see also Mariagiulia Giuffré, Readmission Agreements and Refugee Rights:  From a 
Critique to a Proposal, 32 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 79, 79–111 (2013) (arguing that, in particular situations of 
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Furthermore, what seems to be easily forgotten is that development aid 
is not neutral; to the contrary, all development aid is highly political.97 As 
has been pointed out elsewhere, 
[D]onors . . . usually insist that this money is politically neutral,
that it does not directly benefit the political elite. This is true, as 
most of the money is for schools, roads, health care, and water 
projects. But all development is deeply political. By taking over 
the financing of most public services, donors take pressure off . . .
the government to respond to the needs of its citizens.98
While details of the EU migrant pact on Africa were still in the planning, 
the EU-Turkey deal had already formally been in force for several months.99
It has led to a reduction of new arrivals, but the agreement continues to be
fragile.”100 And while the EU Trust Fund for Africa claims to aim at 
addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and 
irregular migration, there is little in the draft agreements that would promise 
sustainable success, for lack of identifying and addressing the real underlying 
problems at the origin of many of the countries’ deplorable state of affairs.101
V. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
Dr. Denis Mukwege, who for many years has provided help to “victims 
of gang rape and brutal sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,” said in his acceptance speech for the 2014 Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought that “women’s bodies have become a true battlefield 
and rape is being used as a weapon of war.”102 He also stated that “‘we have 
spent too much time and energy fixing the consequences of violence.  It is 
time to take care of the causes,’ and called on the EU and its member states 
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to use all instruments available to support resolving the conflicts in the 
region.”103 Transferred to the question of alternation, the underlying reasons 
for the causes, the root causes, appear to represent the real foundational issues 
when it comes to solving not only the lack of democratic alternation per se,
but also irregular migration and refugee situations. As long as 
mismanagement, embezzlement, systemic corruption, rampant impunity and 
a travesty of justice, of constitutions, and of elections are permitted, if not 
encouraged to take place, alternation, a hoped for democratization, and 
ensuing improvements for the countries affected is unlikely to materialize 
any time soon. The fossilization of the political systems104, a prolongation 
of the aforementioned perpetual presidencies and of bad governance will, in 
turn, continue to have a devastating effect on the youth, on development, or 
lack thereof, and hence contribute to a continuous need for and urge of 
fleeing one’s country or migrating in search of a better future. And, should 
the situation in any of the countries detailed above explode, or what is left of 
a functioning state apparatus implode, taking the violent recent history of 
especially the Great Lakes countries of Africa into account, there is a real 
concern that the security situation in the entire region might severely 
deteriorate and eventually collapse. Hence, western donors should have all 
the incentives to identify and address the real, underlying root causes, instead 
of opting for, or anyways focusing on, shortsighted ‘quick fixes’ and 
concomitant outsourcing of migration control.105
VI. OUTLOOK—WHAT MAY BE DONE?
Many of the Sub-Saharan countries discussed above do have elaborate 
and modern constitutions on paper—but abusive state leaders need to be 
reminded of existing constitutional provisions and held accountable for any 
unconstitutional changes.  This cannot be done unless donors, the EU, AU, 
and the United States, speak with one voice. In fact, in connection with the 
flawed referendum in Congo-Brazzaville, changing the constitution, French 
Prime Minister Francoise Hollande, when asked about it, answered in quite 
vague terms, actually stating that he respected any state leader’s right to 
                                                          
103. Id.
104 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Après les Coups d’État Militaire, l’Union Africaine à l’épreuve 
des Coups d’État Civils, LE MONDE (July 15, 2016, 10:58 A.M.), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/art
icle/2016/07/15/apres-les-coups-d-etat-militaires-l-union-africaine-a-l-epreuve-des-coups-d-etatcivils_
4969931_3212.html.
105. Joe Siegle, The Political Origin of Refugee Crises, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 26, 
2004), http://www.cfr.org/world/political-origin-refugee-crises/p7054#.
 
336 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law       [Vol. 23:2
consult his constituency.106 There was no mentioning and no criticism of the 
form and context of such ‘consultations.’107 Only after the equally flawed, 
ensuing elections and their violent aftermath did the French Foreign Minister, 
Jean-Marc Ayrault, eventually openly criticize Brazzaville.108 Given the 
traditionally strong ties with and position in Congo-Brazzaville the former 
colonial power France has maintained, a more candid, critical stance could 
have made a difference.
Also, on the regional, EU level, there are tentative signs of becoming
more outspoken in the face of human rights violations or electoral travesties 
of justice.  Federica Mogherini, the EU Head of Foreign Affairs, e.g.
criticized Gabon for its recent election, the very limited access given to EU 
election observers contrary to prior agreements, and indicated that the 
confidence of the people of Gabon regarding the integrity of the electoral 
process, may have been put at risk.109 Pushing for electoral observation 
missions and speaking up, are important starting points, not least by thus 
lending the opposition some witnessing eyes. But much more is needed.  
Ultimately having the threat of pursuing and prosecuting state leaders’ most 
egregious crimes before international courts up one’s sleeve, even if those 
institutions for the time being are openly defied by the persons concerned,
may still have an effect, as would working with the AU towards regarding 
constitutional coups d’état similarly critical as military coups d’état. All of 
the above may take a long time to realize, but the perhaps most important 
achievement would be a change of perspective, the realization and 
acknowledgement that the underlying root causes of many a refugee crisis—
the denial of alternation—need to be focused on.  And that could be 
accomplished immediately.
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WHERE ARE WE TODAY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST OVERSEAS
CORRUPTION: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 
AND TWO PROBLEMS GOING FORWARD
Frederick T. Davis*
The goal of my comments is to take a step back and begin with an
historical perspective on the collective, international effort to fight 
corruption, and then to suggest two problems that effort faces today.  One 
of those problems is fairly obvious and much-discussed: some countries do 
much more than others to fight overseas bribery.  The other is less obvious:
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) could do more to encourage 
robust international, collaborative efforts by being clearer on when it will 
recognize, and defer to, the outcomes of criminal investigations overseas.
To begin with a bit of history:
The relevant history began with the 1977 adoption of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 in the aftermath of Watergate; before that,
making a bribe to an official in another country was generally tolerated, and 
no comprehensive legislation prohibited it.2 For roughly twenty years the 
FCPA went largely unenforced by the DOJ.3 It is clear why: as originally 
adopted, as a practical matter it applied only to U.S. corporations and 
persons; it was commonly viewed as singling them out and putting them at 
a competitive disadvantage against non-U.S. multinationals that remained 
free from the risk of prosecution, and even benefited from a tax deduction 
for overseas bribes.
The turning point was the adoption of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention)4 in 1997.  Now signed by forty-one nations, its clear purpose 
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was to create a “level playing field” by obligating its signatory nations to 
adopt laws similar to the FCPA, and to enforce them.  The real history of 
FCPA enforcement began with the implementation of the OECD 
Convention in roughly 2000; DOJ investigations since that date have 
steadily increased, with fines well into the billions of dollars having been 
paid to federal and state treasuries.5 Along the way, a virtual “cottage 
industry” of lawyers and other professionals specializing in FCPA 
investigations has developed.6
Viewed from the perspective of the OECD Convention and its core 
purpose, two significant problems exist today that inhibit the “level playing 
field” goal.  
The first is simply that some countries have been more aggressive, 
effective, and successful in implementing their anti-bribery laws than
others.  This problem was not unforeseen.  The OECD was mindful that 
simply adopting legislation conforming to OECD Convention prerequisites 
was not enough, and that robust—and essentially comparable—
enforcement was key.7 To this end, it has done periodic reviews of its 
signatory nations’ enforcement efforts, and publishes country-by-country 
reviews, available online.8 International Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), such as Transparency International, also publish data and 
commentary comparing relative national success in prosecuting overseas 
bribery.9
One of the countries that has done relatively badly is France10: while 
it adopted legislation that prohibits overseas bribery in 2000, since then, not 
a single corporation has been convicted of that crime.11 There are a number 
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of theories as to why this is the case, on which I12 and others13 have written.  
While there may be issues of political will to prosecute acts that were 
relatively recently encouraged by means of a tax deduction, there are also a 
number of curious procedural impediments and disincentives to French 
prosecutions.14 But France is not alone, as the OECD and NGO reports 
point out.15
Failure to contribute to a “level playing field” despite binding treaty 
obligations to do so is obviously unacceptable. In the case of France, U.S.
prosecuting authorities have reacted by energetically pursuing French 
companies that they deemed subject to U.S. prosecutorial power because of 
those companies’ “presence” in the United States: either through 
maintaining U.S. subsidiaries, because some part of the nefarious activities 
took place on U.S. soil, or perhaps because U.S. dollars were involved.16
Four very large, well-known companies—viewed as “national economic 
champions” in France—have entered guilty pleas and/or Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) with U.S. authorities, and have paid in 
total well over U.S. $2 billion to U.S. treasuries.17 All four of them could 
have been and, in my opinion should have been, prosecuted in France.
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This has not gone unnoticed in France. Clearly as a result of U.S.
pressure via such prosecutions, in December 2016 France adopted the “Loi 
Sapin II,” which progressively goes into effect during 2017.18 This law 
attempts to reinforce French efforts to combat overseas bribery by creating 
a new agency tasked with leading this effort, by creating a new obligation 
for French companies to have a compliance program meeting certain 
standards, by enhancing whistleblower protections, and—most 
controversially—by adopting a sort of DPA, which has never existed in 
French criminal procedures.19 Whether these reforms will create results 
deemed sufficient by U.S. prosecutors and the world community remains 
unclear.20
The second problem I will identify is less obvious, but is also 
important and is linked to the first: Non-U.S. efforts to prosecute overseas 
bribery are hampered by the absence of clear, credible statements from U.S.
prosecutors that they will desist from prosecuting if a local prosecutor does 
so in good faith. Article 4.3 of the OECD Convention provides that in the 
event of multiple investigations of the same conduct, the countries involved 
should coordinate to determine “the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution,”21 clearly envisioning that such a prosecution would be single 
and not multiple.  This has not happened, but rather two scenarios occur 
rather frequently.  First, outcomes in one country—including negotiated 
ones—are sometimes followed by a “me too” prosecution in another.22
And second, multinationals facing multiple prosecutors often reach 
separate, sometimes but not always coordinated, agreements with each.23
This matters because of the baleful, disruptive effect a U.S.
prosecution has on efforts elsewhere.  Simply put, U.S. prosecutors have 
powers that most of their European counterparts can only dream of:
unfettered discretion, virtual absence of judicial control over investigations 
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and negotiated outcomes,24 expansive views of their extraterritorial 
powers25 coupled with the fact that more than eighty percent of 
international business deals are denominated in U.S. dollars, very helpful 
laws on corporate criminal responsibility,26 the risk of huge corporate 
penalties and the ability to cumulate such penalties, investigations that last 
months rather than multiple years, powers of evidence-gathering from 
which corporations are virtually helpless in shielding incriminating 
information, virtual freedom from any double jeopardy/ne bis in idem
constraints,27 and flexible procedures such as DPAs and NPAs—all enable 
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them to move more quickly, and to strike far more terror into the hearts of 
corporate decision-makers, than can European prosecutors.  As a result, my 
strong sense from speaking with prosecutors, defense lawyers, and 
corporate counsel in France is that if a company feels it faces the risk of 
U.S. as well as French prosecution, it will focus its efforts on dealing with 
the U.S. risk in the first instance, and assume that French prosecutors will 
fall into place later. In essence, as I have put it elsewhere, the U.S. is 
positioned as the “ultimate arbiter” on the sufficiency of bribery 
prosecutions around the world28—as well as the recipient of billions of 
dollars of criminal and administrative fines, and other payments, made on 
the basis of such prosecutions.
This situation could lead to trouble.  The “level playing field” that the 
OECD Convention envisioned was not only a world in which companies of 
all nationalities faced the same prohibitions and comparable risks of 
prosecution, but in which prosecutors would have an equal say in outcomes.  
Given the relative ineffectiveness of many countries’ efforts, the fact that 
the U.S. prosecutors have attempted to fill this gap is neither surprising nor, 
in itself, wrong.  But there are already indications of resentment in France, 
perhaps in other countries as well; a recent article in two mainstream 
national publications29 referred to U.S. prosecutions of French companies as 
a “big racket” designed to make money for U.S. treasuries and to protect 
U.S. companies, and legislators in the National Assembly are gathering 
information in an apparent effort to combat this situation, including the 
possibility of retaliation.30
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Without slowing their efforts to prosecute overseas corruption, U.S.
prosecutors could do more to emphasize unambiguously that they will 
respect non-U.S. outcomes that are resolved in good faith and on an 
appropriate basis, and to articulate the criteria they use to determine the 
appropriateness or sufficiency of those outcomes.  In recent months, senior 
DOJ officials have emphasized their willingness to work with their 
counterparts abroad, and apparently believe that those efforts are fruitful.31
However, when asked in public conferences what criteria they use to 
evaluate non-U.S. outcomes, their publicly available responses are vague.32
The DOJ issues careful and detailed “guidelines” on many aspects of their 
discretionary authority to charge offenses, but no such guidelines address 
the weight they will give to non-U.S. outcomes, or procedures 
multinationals should follow in that situation.  And the DOJ’s recent track 
record is unclear.  In 2014, the Dutch offshore giant SBM Offshore (SBM),
which had announced in 2012 that it was under investigation by the DOJ,
negotiated an outcome with Dutch authorities, followed immediately by a 
DOJ decision not to prosecute.33 This gave heart to the prospect of 
deference to non-U.S. outcomes and perhaps unsurprisingly led to an 
immediate surge in the value of SBM’s shares in the marketplace, reflecting 
the immense monetary cost of the mere fact of being investigated by U.S.
prosecutors.34 More recently, in the Vimpelcom35 and the Embraer36
matters, the DOJ did not defer to non-U.S. prosecutions but rather shared 
the penalty payments (on a roughly 50/50 basis in the first, roughly 80/20 in 
favor of the U.S. in the second) with their counterparts.  In the four 
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35. Vimpelcom Limited and Unitel LLC Enter into Global Foreign Bribery Resolution, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vimpelcom-limited-and-unitel-llc-enter-
global-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-795-million.
36. Embraer Agrees to Pay More than $107 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Charges, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/embraer-agrees-paymore-
107-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-charges.
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principal FCPA outcomes negotiated between U.S. authorities and French 
companies, involving Total, Technip, Alcatel, and Alstom, the DOJ
sometimes praised their French counterparts for their “cooperation,” but did 
not share a single dollar of the more than $2 billion paid in fines and 
forfeitures.37 If those striking distinctions in outcome were based on 
principles, the principles are certainly not apparent.  But unless the DOJ
does more to recognize the sovereign concerns of its trading partners—
whether by deferring to their prosecutions, or at a minimum sharing the 
proceeds, and making clear the principles it follows in doing so—it risks 
inhibiting those partners’ efforts and creating tensions with them.38
                                             
37. Total, supra note 17; Alstom, supra note 17; Technip, supra note 17; Alcatel-Lucent, supra
note 17.
38. Frederick T. Davis, The US Needs To Show More Respect for Foreign Prosecutors, GAB
(Nov. 3, 2016, 7:30 AM), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/11/03/guest-post-the-us-needs-to-
show-more-respect-for-foreign-prosecutions/; see also Michael Maruca, Equitable Sharing, Not 
Deference: How US FCPA Enforcers Should Accommodate Foreign Interests, GAB (Dec. 16, 2016, 
10:00 AM), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/12/16/equitable-sharing-not-deference-how-us-
fcpa-enforcers-should-accommodate-foreign-interests; Frederick T. Davis, The Case for Greater US 
Deference to Foreign Anticorruption Prosecutions—A Response to Maruca, GAB (Feb. 13, 2017, 10:00 
AM), https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2017/02/13/guest-post-the-case-for-greater-us-deference-to-
foreign-anticorruption-prosecutions-a-response-to-maruca/.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an issue that has come under increasing scrutiny amid allegations
of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations (U.N.) personnel,
including peacekeeping forces, and allegations that peacekeepers introduced
cholera to Haiti.1 Any starting point for considering whether the U.N. is
“above the law” and possible innovative “legal responses to build a more
accountable U.N.” is an analysis of where the U.N. is today on these
important issues.2 Following is a two-part analysis: first of the remedies
available generally to third parties harmed by the activities of U.N.
peacekeeping operations with a particular focus on the Haiti cholera victims;
second, of the regime governing sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N.
personnel and U.N. peacekeeping forces. As this two-part analysis will
demonstrate, the problems that have arisen that raise the issue whether the
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1. Panel including August Reinisch, Caramba Kandeh, and Beatrice Lindstrom, moderated by
Kristen Boon, Above The Law? Innovating New Legal Responses to Build a More Accountable U.N.,
International Law Weekend of the ILA/ 2 ILSA (2016).
2. For discussion of where the U.N. might go in the future to address possible innovative ways
to build a more accountable future see August Reinisch, To What Extent Can and Should National Courts
‘Fill the Accountability Gap?’, 10 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 572 (2014); Kristen E. Boon, The United Nations
as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 341 (Winter 2016); CODE BLUE, A
Practical Plan to End Impunity for Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/514a
0127e4b04d7440e8045d/t/588289db2994ca3d59b93c38/1484949980156/FINAL+Special+Courts+Mec
hanism+-+Updated+January+2017.pdf (last updated Jan. 2017).
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U.N. is “above the law” stem more from failures to timely and
conscientiously follow the provisions of existing regimes that govern these
matters rather than the absence of appropriate obligations or mechanisms
under those existing regimes—the absence of the political will to do the right
thing in a timely manner!
II. REMEDIES GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO THIRD PARTIES HARMED
BY U.N. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
Since the creation of the U.N., the need for the organization to enjoy
immunity from the jurisdiction of Member States has been widely recognized
as necessary to achieve its important and far ranging purposes under the U.N.
Charter.3 However, throughout the years, it has been understood that this
immunity was not intended simply to shield the Organization from
responsibility as a “good citizen” on the world stage to respond to justifiable
claims against the Organization by third parties resulting from the activities
or operations of the Organization. The U.N. has largely achieved the
objective of assuming its responsibility as a good citizen, although three
recent situations in the peacekeeping context have raised questions about
whether it continues to do so—claims against the U.N. by the Mothers of
Srebrenica, displaced persons in Kosovo, and Haiti cholera victims.
Generally, claims by third parties against the U.N. cover a broad range
of claimants who allege to have been harmed in some way by the activities
or operations of the Organization, and generally divide into two categories:
claims of a contractual nature and tort claims.
In regard to third party contract claims, individual consultants,
contractors—large and small—and others who interact with the U.N.,
including in the peacekeeping context, generally must seek to resolve their
claims in some manner under Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the U.N. (the General Convention)—calling for the U.N.
to establish a modality for resolving disputes of a private law character.4
The principal modality for resolving disputes of a private law character
since the inception of the U.N. has meant initially an effort to amicably
resolve the dispute administratively e.g., negotiated settlement. Failing such
an amicable resolution, the usual modality has been for the parties to seek to
resolve the dispute through arbitration, usually under the terms of the contract
entered into with the Organization that provide for such arbitration and
specifies how it is to be organized.5
                                                
3. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1–4; U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1.
4. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, Feb. 13, 1946,
21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
5. Bruce Rashkow, Immunity of the United Nations: Practice and Challenges, 10 INT’L ORG.
L. REV. 332, 337–39 (2013).
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In regard to tort claims, initially, the focus was on automobile accidents
involving U.N. vehicles or vehicles driven by U.N. staff or officials in the
performance of official functions—including in the field. Over the years, as
the role of the U.N. expanded in the area of peacekeeping and other field
missions, it became necessary or desirable for the Organization to obtain its
own air carrier capability, routinely through charter arrangements with
providers of the aircraft, rather than rely on services provided by commercial
entities or even member states. In both instances, the U.N. has relied on
worldwide insurance policies to address its exposure to risks of third party
claims, although in regard to air services it also seeks to protect itself
contractually by shifting the risk to the provider of the aircraft.6
In regard to third party claims resulting from the operations and
activities of operational subsidiary bodies of the U.N. in the field, e.g., UNDP
and UNICEF, those organizations routinely enter into agreements with the
beneficiary states where such activities occur to hold harmless the
Organization in respect of claims that may arise in relation to its activities.7
With respect to peacekeeping missions, the Organization has internal
administrative processes in place to deal with claims against the
Organization.8 Initially, these processes have included local internal claims
review boards the decisions of which may be challenged by requests for
further administrative review within the Organization.9 As a practical matter,
these boards have worked well over the years to resolve claims on a day-to-
day basis, even if at times their decisions have been administratively
challenged.
However, the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with the States in
which such peacekeeping missions take place have historically also provided
routinely for a standing claims commission. Notably, throughout the history
of U.N. peacekeeping missions no such commission has ever been
established.10
                                                
6. See Rashkow, supra note 5.
7. Id. at 340; see also Michael Wood, Do International Organizations Enjoy Immunity Under
Customary International Law?, in 55 LEGAL ASPECTS INT’L ORG., IMMUNITY INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 12 (Niels M. Blokker & Nico J. Schrijver eds., 2015).
8. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 339; see also Administration of Justice in the United Nations, A
Guide to Resolving Disputes, 1 (2009), http://www.un.org/en/oaj/unjs/pdf/guide_to_resolving_disputes_
en.pdf.
9. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 339–41; U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary
Aspect of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Liability
Report I].
10. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 344–45; see also Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9,
¶ 8; U.N. Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspect of the Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
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Over the years, for one reason or another, tort claims have usually been
amicably resolved without recourse to arbitration.11 That said, occasionally,
the Organization has been sued or threatened to be sued in a national court.
Such suits are inevitably either amicably resolved or dismissed on the basis
of the Organization’s immunity.12
In the late 1990s, however, in response to the growth in peacekeeping
missions and related claims, the Organization adopted a special regime to
deal specifically with third party contract and tort claims arising in the
context of such missions.13
Notably, the Organization went to great lengths in designing this regime
to balance the obligations of U.N. peacekeeping missions to respond to third
party claims with the obligations of the host country that invited such mission
into the country to assume some responsibility in principle for such claims.14
That balance resulted in certain types of claims being excluded altogether
and limits being set on the damages for which the Organization would be
liable in relation to certain contract and tort claims. The Organization
established these financial limitations with the understanding that the host
country would ultimately be responsible for compensation, if any, beyond
these limits.15
The regime excludes liability altogether for claims resulting from or
attributable to activities of U.N. peacekeepers arising from “operational
necessity”. 16 The concept of “operational necessity” was developed
specifically in connection with U.N. peacekeeping operations and, while
similar to the more traditional concept of “military necessity”, goes a bit
further.17 Notably, the concept of “military necessity”, governed by the laws
of war, remains under the new regime as an exemption from liability
specifically relating to combat operations.18
The new regime imposes temporal and financial limitations on the
liability of the Organization in terms of personal injury, illness or death and
                                                
A/51/903 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Peacekeeping Liability Report II].
11. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340; see also August Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIB. OF INT’L. L. (2009), http://legal.
un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa_e.pdf.
12. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340–41.
13. See G.A. Res. 52/247, Third-Party Liability: Temporal and Financial Limitations (July 17,
1998).
14. Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶ 20.
15. Id. ¶¶ 39, 42.
16. See G.A. Res. 52/247, supra note 13, ¶ 6; Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶
14.
17. See Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9, ¶ 16.
18. Id.
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for property damage resulting from or attributable the activities of
peacekeeping operations in the performance of their official duties.19 In this
last respect, it also excludes certain kinds of damages, e.g., non-economic
loss.20
The new regime recognizes that third party claims may continue to be
addressed, as they have in the past, by local claims review boards.21 It also
preserves the long-standing but never invoked option under SOFA
arrangements for the establishment of a standing claims commission.22
Underlying the efforts of the Organization throughout the years to
amicably settle third party claims is the desire or goal of the U.N. to be, and
to be seen as, a good citizen on the world stage; to be fundamentally fair in
dealing with individuals injured in some manner as a direct result of U.N.
actions.
However, with the increase in peacekeeping activities and the evolution
of more robust peacekeeping mandates since the end of the Cold War, the
realities of such a more active engagement have raised new challenges.
These challenges are perhaps most clearly reflected in the decisions of the
U.N. in invoking immunity in the face of claims by the Mothers of
Srebrenica, the displaced persons in Kosovo and the Haitian cholera victims.
On the one hand, with both the Mothers of Srebrenica and the Kosovo
cases, the issue is the failure of the U.N. to appropriately protect innocent
civilians in situations involving threats of armed hostilities. In the case of
Mothers of Srebrenica, it was the failure of the U.N. peacekeeping mission
to protect such civilians from almost certain death pursuant to a policy, if not
mandate, to provide such protection in the face of an armed attack by hostile
forces.23 In the case of Kosovo24, it was the placement by the U.N. Interim
Administration in Kosovo of internal displaced persons in camps to protect
such civilians from the threat of armed hostilities that, because of lead
pollution, resulted in damage to their health. With the Haitian cholera
victims, it is the issue of the ostensible negligence of the U.N. in failing to
adequately screen troops for cholera prior to deployment in Haiti or to
                                                
19. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 340–41.
20. See G.A. Res. 52/247, supra note 13.
21. Id.
22. Peacekeeping Liability Report I, supra note 9.
23. European Court of Human Rights Press Release ECHR 194, Complaint About UN’s
Immunity from National Jurisdiction in Civil Case Concerning Srebrenica Massacre Declared
Inadmissible (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release].
24. Letter from U.N. Under-Secretary-General Addressing the Claim for Compensation on
Behalf of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Residents of Internally Displaced Person (“IDP”) Camps in
Mitrovica, Kosovo, UNITED NATIONS (July 25, 2011), http://www.sivola.net/download/UN%20Rejection
.pdf [hereinafter Claim for Compensation].
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properly maintain waste treatment facilities utilized by such troops that
arguably caused a cholera outbreak that affected innocent civilians.25
In each of these cases, the U.N. declined to accept responsibility to
compensate the victims for injuries they suffered as a result of the actions of
those U.N. missions.
The Mothers of Srebrenica case was initially brought in Dutch courts
where the U.N. maintained its immunity. 26 The Dutch Supreme Court,
overruling the Appellate Court, upheld that immunity as absolute, indicating
that the assertion of immunity under Section 2 of the General Convention is
not affected by the failure of the U.N. to provide a modality for bringing these
claims under Section 29 of the Convention.27 The ruling of the Dutch
Supreme Court raises a fundamental issue of the relationship of the claimed
immunity under Section 2 of the General Convention to the requirement
under Section 29 for the U.N. to provide a modality for reviewing these
claims.28 The ruling also raises the issue of what is meant under Section 29
by its reference to disputes of a “private law character”.29
The claimants appealed this decision to the European Court of Human
Rights.30 That Court declared the application of the Mothers of Srebrenica
inadmissible. In so doing, the Court upheld the immunity of the U.N. stating,
in passing, that what was at issue were operations established by the Security
Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter fundamental to
the mission of the U.N. to secure international peace and security, and the
Convention (European Convention on Human Rights) cannot be interpreted
in a manner that would subject the acts and omissions of the Security Council
to domestic jurisdiction without the accord of the U.N.31
The use of force under a U.N. Security Council mandate is always a
complex issue. The distinction that the Court drew between Chapter VII
peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council and the
requirement of the European Convention is inherently relevant and important
to the issue of whether the actions of the U.N. troops that are at the heart of
                                                
25. See generally Cholera Litigation Frequently Asked Questions, INST. FOR JUST. &
DEMOCRACY HAITI, http://www.ijdh.org/2014/12/topics/health/cholera-litigation-faq/ (last visited on
Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
26. Thomas Henquet, Introductory Note to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands: Mothers of
Srebrenica Association et al. v. The Netherlands, 51 I.L.M. 1322–363 (2012).
27. Id.; see also Bella Murati, U.N. Immunity Overrides Ius Cogens Norms of International
Law, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (July 23, 2013), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/07/23/unimm
unity-overrides-ius-cogens-norms-of-international-law/#more-2135.
28. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 342.
29. Id.
30. Press Release, supra note 23.
31. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 344.
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the claims of the Mothers of Srebrenica present a claim under Section 29 of
a “private law character”.
In the Kosovo case, the U.N. Interim Administration asserted that the
claims do constitute claims of a private law character, adding that the claims
‘in essence amount to a review of the performance of the U.N.’s mandate as
the Interim Administration of Kosovo’.32 Notably in exercising its authority
as “the Interim Administration”, the U.N. arguably was exercising
“governmental authority” on behalf of or in the place of whatever national
governmental entity might have been responsible for the area in the absence
of the U.N. Security Council having created a U.N. peacekeeping mission to
do so. It is important to note what would appear to be critical distinctions
between that situation and the Haiti situation.
Initially, and perhaps most critical, is the fact that in Kosovo, the U.N.
was not operating in the capacity simply of a “peacekeeping mission”. It was
acting in the capacity essentially of the temporary governmental authority—
the “Interim Administration”. Moreover, in this context, in explaining its
position, the U.N. addressed other possibly critical factors relating to the long
history of industrial pollution in the area and the precarious security situation
in Kosovo to which the U.N. was responding in order to protect lives.33
Arguably, when the U.N. acts in such circumstances, it is acting in a
“governmental capacity” as well as a peacekeeping capacity, especially given
the security aspects of the precarious situation and the risk to innocent lives.
In this respect, there is a much stronger case for characterizing the actions of
the “Interim Administration” as addressing political or policy matters of a
governmental nature that do not give rise to claims of a private law character
within the meaning of Section 29, than there is in the Haiti situation.
On the other hand, it is much more difficult to see how the new
peacekeeping liability regime would not apply to the Haitian cholera victims.
More specifically, it is difficult to understand the position of the U.N. that
these claims “are not receivable”.
In the case of the Haitian cholera victims, the U.N. initially and for a
long time simply took the position that the claims are “not receivable”.34 The
only rationale publicly provided in asserting this defense was its assertion
that considering those claims would necessarily include a review of political
                                                
32. Claim for Compensation, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 25. See also Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits
Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016
/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html?_r=0.
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or policy matters.35 The claimants while continuing to urge the Organization
to establish a claims commission under the terms of the SOFA with Haiti to
review these claims, filed suit against the U.N. in the Federal District Court
in New York.36
The U.N. did not respond to the lawsuit and, instead, requested that the
United States Government seek dismissal of the case on the U.N.’s behalf.37
In March 2014, the U.S. Attorney filed a statement of interest in the case,
asserting the absolute immunity of the defendants under Section 2 of the
General Convention.38 During the briefing and hearing on the issue of
immunity, the claimants clarified that they were not arguing that there had
been a waiver of immunity, express or implied, but that, because the U.N.
had failed to provide a modality for resolving their claims in breach of its
obligations under Section 29, the U.N. was not entitled to assert immunity
under Section 2 of the Convention, among other arguments.39 In January
2015 the District Court judge dismissed the case on the basis of the U.N.’s
immunity from suit under Section 2.40 Plaintiffs appealed in February 2015
and, following the submission of briefs, the case was argued before the Court
in March 2015.41 The Court handed down its opinion on August 18, 2016,
affirming the decision of the lower court.42 But that decision, while resolving
the claim in those courts on the basis of the absolute immunity of the U.N.
under Section 2 of the General Convention, does not answer the question of
whether the Haitian claims are of a “private law character” under Section 29
of the General Convention.
The history and basis of a defense that tort claims by third parties against
the U.N. “are not receivable” apparently is relatively recent, and until the
Haiti cholera case has not been the subject of much scrutiny. For example,
it came to the attention of a number of scholars, only during the course of the
public discussion of the Haiti cholera case, that the Organization in 2011 used
that formulation in response to claims against the Organization in the
                                                
35. Rashkow, supra note 5, at 343; see also Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Rejects Damage Claim for
Haiti Cholera Victims, INST. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY HAITI (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.ijdh.org/2013
/02/topics/health/un-rejects-damage-claim-for-haiti-cholera-victims/.
36. See Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that in
October 2013, IJDH and partners filed a class-action lawsuit against the U.N. in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, on behalf of Haitian and Haitian-American cholera victims and their
families). Subsequently, two other class actions were filed against the U.N., another in the Southern
District of New York and a third in the Eastern District of New York.
37. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 25.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246.
41. See Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2016).
42. Id.
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Kosovo.
That said, for a long time, the U.N. has declined to explain the basis of
its assertions in the Haiti cholera matter that the claims are “not receivable”
because considering those claims would necessarily include a review of
political or policy matters. However, recently, in two instances, the U.N.
offered a fuller explanation of the basis of its position.
The first such fuller explanation was a letter dated November 24, 2014
from the Secretary General responding to a letter dated 25 September 2014
from three Special Rapporteurs and one Independent Expert appointed by the
Human Rights Council which constituted in the Human Rights context an
“allegation” letter.43 The “allegation” letter suggests that the U.N. by its
response to the claims of the Haiti cholera victims violated the human rights
of these victims in a number of respects, most particularly by denying that
the U.N. was the cause of the cholera outbreak and by denying the victims a
right to a legal remedy.44 In accordance with established procedures with
such “allegation” letters, the U.N. was requested to provide a response to the
concerns expressed in the letter.45
The second such fuller explanation was a letter from the Secretary
General dated February 19, 2015 responding to a letter to him dated
December 18, 2014, by 77 Members of the U.S. Congress urging the U.N. to
provide a modality to review the claims of the Haitian cholera victims.46
The Secretary General’s November 25, 2014 response to the
“allegation” letter deals at considerable length in denying the “human rights
basis” for the claims of the victims.47 In respect of the “legal basis” for
rejecting these claims, the November 25 letter asserts the argument that
claims based on political or policy related grievances “such as those related
to the actions or decisions taken by the Security Council or the General
Assembly” are excluded.48 However, it goes on to establish a principled legal
framework for determining whether particular claims qualify as having a
                                                
43. Letter from Pedro Medrano, Assistant U.N. Secretary-General, Senior Coordinator for
Cholera Response to Ms. Farha, Mr. Gallon, Mr. Pura and Ms. de Albuquerque, UNITED NATIONS (Nov.
25, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/Haiti-Nov14-explanation-to-SRs.pdf [hereinafter
Letter from Pedro Medrano].
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 19, 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the Distinguished Members of Congress (Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Ban Ki-moon]. See
also Jake Johnson, Ban Ki-moon Explains to Congress Why the U.N. Won’t be Held Accountable for
Cholera in Haiti, HAITI RELIEF & RECONSTRUCTION WATCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://cepr.net/blogs/haiti-
relief-and-reconstruction-watch/ban-ki-moon-explains-to-congress-why-the-un-wont-be-held
accountable-for-cholera-in-haiti.
47. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
48. Id.
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“private law character”.49 Thus, it asserts that in assessing a claim under
Section 29, the “Organization does not rely solely on the allegations of the
claim itself but also assesses the character of the claim in the context of all
of its circumstances.”50 It further asserts that “the nature of the duty allegedly
owed by the Organization, the nature of the conduct or activity at issue, and
other relevant circumstances are all pertinent”.51
The letter addresses three instances where claims were asserted but the
U.N. declined to recognize such claims, as if to suggest that these examples
support the conclusion that the Haitian claims do not and cannot qualify
under the framework set out as having a “private law character”. 52
Unfortunately, the examples cited do not support that conclusion. Two of
the instances were the Mothers of Srebrenica case and the claims of the
Kosovo displaced persons, already addressed above and distinguishable from
the Haiti situation for reasons previously discussed.53 The third instance was
the refusal of the U.N. in 1996 to accede to a request by the Rwandan
Government in 1996 to establish a claims commission to review fourteen
claims relating to the alleged failure of the U.N. (UNAMIR) in the context
of the 1994 genocide to provide protection to Rwandan nationals.54 While
this appears to have been the first public discussion of the Rwandan request,
the Rwandan case is similar in nature to the Mothers of Srebrenica case, and
can be distinguished on the same basis that the claims relate to an issue of a
use of force by a U.N. peacekeeping force under a Chapter VII resolution by
the Security Council. In conclusion, while this “fuller” explanation is more
detailed than both the earlier ones made during the litigation in U.S. courts
(and also the later one made to the 77 U.S. Congressmen), it fails to explain
how the Haitian claims do not qualify as having a “private law character.”
The Secretary General’s response of February 19, 2015 to the 77 U.S.
Congressmen’s letter highlights the serious efforts of the U.N. to address the
crisis—at the national and local level.55 Unfortunately, the letter does not
resolve the longstanding controversy of whether the U.N. shares any legal
responsibility for the crisis. The Secretary General’s letter again correctly
focuses on the legal issue of whether the Haitian victims may be viewed as
having a claim against the Organization under Section 29 of the General
Convention, or under the SOFA between the U.N. and Haiti.56 The letter
                                                
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
53. Rashkow, supra note 5 at 344; Claim for Compensation, supra note 24.
54. Letter from Pedro Medrano, supra note 43.
55. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
56. Id.
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notes that Section 29 is limited by its terms to consideration of private law
claims, going on to broadly describe such claims as those “arising under
contracts, claims relating to the use of private property in peacekeeping
contexts or claims arising from motor vehicle accidents”, and acknowledges
that the Organization has regularly received and provided compensation for
such claims.57 However, it goes on to assert that claims by Haitian victims
are “not receivable” because, unlike the other claims mentioned, those claims
“raised broad issues of policy that arose out of the functions of the U.N. as
an international organization” and, therefore, “could not form the basis of a
private law character”.58 Essentially for the same reason, the letter dismisses
the argument that Haitian victims should be able to bring their claims before
a claims commission established pursuant to the SOFA.59 Notably, the letter
does not identify the “broad issues of policy that arose out of the functions
of the U.N. as an international organization” upon which it is relying to
distinguish the Haiti claims from the kinds of claims it acknowledges are
recognized as receivable, or otherwise to explain how the Haiti claims “d[o]
not fall within the scope of Section 29.”60
Initially, as a matter of principle, it would be possible, as the letter from
the Members of the U.S. Congress proposed, to establish a claims
commission under the SOFA to address the Haitian claims. No such
commission has ever been established despite the fact that the authority to do
so has been included in virtually every SOFA executed over the long history
of U.N. peacekeeping missions.
Establishing such a commission for the first time in these circumstances
presents a number of complex legal and practical issues. Initially, it would
be necessary to establish the composition and mandate for such a
commission, including the standard for compensation of victims. It would
also be necessary to identify funding to provide such compensation. Such an
exercise has been complicated in the matter of the Haitian cholera victims by
years of inaction and intervening events, such as the earthquake of 2010 and
the recent devastating hurricane. For example, identifying the victims and
causation in these circumstances raises significant challenges in a country
where allegedly there is not a regular and reliable system for recording these
matters.61 Of course, in the U.N., there is always the issue of providing the
funds to establish and operate such a commission and for compensating the
thousands of claimants. 62 Even were there a will to establish such a
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60. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
61. See U.N. Secretary-General, A New Approach to Cholera in Haiti, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. A/71/620
(Nov. 25, 2016) [hereinafter New Approach].
62. Id. ¶¶ 58–59.
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commission, providing relief to the victims through such a mechanism could
take years.
In any event, such a commission is not the only way that the
Organization can acknowledge any responsibility it may have for the crisis
or respond to claims. Thus, the U.N. has routinely handled such third party
claims in the past through local internal review boards established in the
peacekeeping missions, or through negotiated settlement agreements.
Indeed, in 1965, in another situation that, somewhat like this case, involved
mass claims relating to the activities of the U.N. peacekeeping mission—in
the Congo (ONUC), the Organization negotiated lump sum settlements to
resolve the matter.
In the late 1960s, the U.N. was faced with some 1400 claims by Belgian
nationals as well as claims from individuals from various other countries for
damage to persons and property in the Congo caused by U.N. peacekeepers.
In that instance, the U.N. negotiated a lump sum settlement of all Belgium
nationals with the Belgian Government accepting $1.5 million as a final
settlement of such claims.63 A similar lump sum settlement was reached with
the USSR regarding claims by Russian nationals.
Under the circumstances, it is difficult to understand the argument that
the Haiti claims are not of a “private law character” under Section 29,
especially given the long practice of the U.N. in recognizing claims by those
injured as a direct result of U.N. activities including in the peacekeeping
context. Thus, in addition to the kinds of claims mentioned in the Secretary
General’s letter to the U.S. Congressmen, the U.N. has since its inception
recognized that those directly injured as a result of negligent activity by the
Organization, for example in the maintenance of the U.N. Headquarters in
New York, are entitled to make a claim against the Organization. In
principle, the same is true in other instances where the U.N. might arguably
have failed to safely maintain or operate its facilities and equipment or
vehicles, including in the peacekeeping context. Indeed, it is more difficult
to understand the argument that the U.N. is not legally responsible for the
cholera outbreak, at least in part, in light of the special legal regime
established by the U.N. in the late 1990s to deal with claims by private
individuals specifically in the context of peace- keeping operations.
Thus, it is difficult to understand what is meant by “broad issues of
policy that arose out of the functions of the U.N. as an international
organization” and which “could not form the basis of a claim of a private law
                                                
63. See Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Between the United Nations and
Belgium Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgian
Nationals, Belg.-United Nations, Feb. 20, 1965, 535 U.N.T.S. 198.
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character”64 or how such an argument is consistent with the long history of
the U.N. responding to claims for personal injury resulting from the actions
of the Organization and the specific provisions of the peacekeeping liability
regime.
Notably, were the U.N. to acknowledge some responsibility, it would
be open to the Organization to work out with the Government of Haiti and
other interested parties some appropriate way to address that responsibility.
Of course, any such outcome could and should take into account the ongoing
efforts of the U.N. more generally to prevent the further spread of cholera in
Haiti and provide the afflicted communities and individuals with assistance.
What is important for the reputation and credibility of U.N. is for it to
acknowledge some responsibility for the crisis and, as a good citizen on the
world stage, to address that responsibility. It appears that the U.N. may in
fact be moving in that direction.
Thus, the U.N. has recently dramatically changed its position regarding
the Haiti cholera victims both offering an apology for not having done more
to assist the victims of the cholera as the tragedy unfolded and
acknowledging that it has a “moral” obligation to assist the victims.65
In August of 2016, Secretary Ban Ki Moon, whose term would conclude
at the end of the year, announced a new approach to cholera in Haiti. He
stated that he deeply regrets the terrible suffering that the people of Haiti have
endured as a result of the epidemic and that the U.N. has a moral
responsibility to the victims and to support Haiti in overcoming the epidemic.
The Secretary General indicated that the new approach, that he aimed to
present to the General Assembly, consisted of two tracks. Track One, to
intensify support for cholera control and response, and Track Two, a proposal
to provide material assistance for those most affected by cholera.66
The announcement of this new approach is said to have been prompted
by the Report of Philip Alston, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty
and Human Rights.67 A draft of Alston’s report became known to the U.N.
                                                
64. Letter from Ban Ki-moon, supra note 46.
65. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Apologizes for United Nations
Role in Haiti Cholera Epidemic, Urges International Funding of New Response to Disease, U.N. Press
Release SG/SM/18323-GA/11862 (Dec. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Statement of Secretary General of Dec. 1,
2016]; see also New Approach, supra note 61.
66. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 1.
67. See Philip Alston, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (Oct. 5, 2016), https://assets.document
cloud.org/documents/3173480/United-Nations-Letters-on-Cholera.pdf; see also Phillip Alston (Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Human Right) Statement 2016/68 (Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter
Statement of Philip Alston].
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Secretariat and the public about the same time that the Secretary General
announced his new approach to cholera in Haiti. Notably, both of those
developments occurred around the same time as the U.S. Court of Appeals
announced its decision rejecting the appeal of the Haitian claimants on
immunity grounds.
In October, the U.N. Security Council, in renewing the mandate for the
Haiti peacekeeping mission, took note of intention of the Secretary General
to develop a package that would provide material assistance and support to
those Haitians directly affected by cholera.68
In November, the Secretary General issued his report to the General
Assembly elaborating his proposals for a two-track approach to cholera in
Haiti. The proposals in Track One involve intensifying the Organization’s
support in order to reduce and ultimately end transmission of cholera,
improve access to care and treatment and address longer-term issues of water,
sanitation and health systems in Haiti. Track Two proposes the development
of a package that will provide material assistance and support to those
Haitians most directly affected by cholera. The Secretary General stressed
that these efforts must include, as a central focus, the victims of the disease
and their families.
Track One essentially is a continuation and enhancement of the
initiative that the Secretary General and the U.N. had launched in 2014, but
which never received the financial support envisioned in those proposals and
was overtaken by the impact of Hurricane Matthew on Haiti.69 Track Two,
however, contains new elements intended to reflect the Organization’s
commitment to assist and support those most directly affected.70 The Report
states that consideration is given under Track Two to two possible elements:
a) a community approach; and b) an individual approach.71 Under the
community approach, victims and their families and affected communities
would receive assistance and support through community projects, in
particular relating to poverty, poor housing, and lack of basic services.72
Projects would be established in consultation with communities and, to the
extent possible, linked to and coordinated with Track One.73 The Report
indicates that the individual approach relates to the payment of money to
families of those individuals who died of cholera, suggesting the payment of
                                                
68. S.C. Res. 2313, ¶ 3 (Oct. 13, 2016).
69. New Approach, supra note 61, ¶ 20.
70. Id. ¶ 36.
71. Id. ¶ 41.
72. Id. ¶ 42.
73. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
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a fixed amount per deceased individual that would be the same for each
household.74
As the Report acknowledges, Track Two “is aimed at providing a
meaningful, but necessarily imperfect, response to the impact of cholera on
individuals, families and communities.”75 The Report candidly highlights
the many imperfections in the initiative. It stresses that secure funding
simply to enable “development of a meaningful package” is essential to
ensuring the appropriate consultations, including at the state and local level
in Haiti, and is useful to avoid raising expectations.76 It provides that it is
“imperative” to have the assurance of adequate funding for community
projects prior even to conducting consultations in the affected communities.77
With respect to the individual approach, it asserts that accurate information
as to the number of cholera deaths and the identification of the deceased and
their family members is required, while identifying serious challenges in
obtaining such information. As with the community based approach, the
Report states that the individual approach would also require “further
development of the package”, which would itself require funding, as well as
the certainty of a threshold amount of funding sufficient to provide a
meaningful fixed amount per cholera death.78 Finally, the Report stresses
that a priority is to be given to eliminating cholera and responding to the
devastating effects of Hurricane Matthew, and that the “new approach” to
cholera in Haiti is premised on the assumption that sufficient additional
“voluntary” funding will be made available to deliver on Track Two without
detracting from Track One.79
In December, the Secretary General presented his new approach to the
General Assembly and sought its support for this new initiative.80 In the
course of his comments, the Secretary General reiterated his deep regret for
the loss of life and suffering caused by the cholera outbreak in Haiti and,
again apologized on behalf of the U.N. to the Haitian people. The Secretary
General made clear that he was apologizing for the U.N. not having done
enough with regard to the cholera outbreak and its spread in Haiti. He again
referred to the U.N.’s failure in this regard as a “blemish” on the reputation
of U.N. peacekeeping and the Organization world-wide, and to the “moral
responsibility” on the U.N. to act. In this context, he acknowledged that
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funding for the efforts of the U.N. to assist the people of Haiti has proven
difficult to secure.
The Secretary General described the new two-track approach, for which
he requested $400 million over two years divided equally between Track One
and Track Two. He explained that work on Track One was well under way,
describing work being undertaken, thanking donors who have provided
support for Track One, and expressing the hope that further contributions
would become available soon. With respect to the community approach
under Track Two, he noted that the U.N. has been consulting with the
Government of Haiti and that the consultations will continue into 2017. His
comments reflected a focus on projects reflecting community needs not
related to cholera, such as education grants, microfinance and other
initiatives that would be complementary to and, to the extent possible,
consistent with work under Track One. With respect to the individual
approach, his comments focused on the requirements for identification of the
deceased and their family members and the certainty of sufficient funding for
compensation. In this respect, he expressed the need for further on the
ground consultations top develop this package, while acknowledging the
difficulties relating to the development of the needed information.
Concluding, the Secretary General referred to the “familiar obstacle” of
adequate funding; stressing that funding for Track One needs to be
prioritized.81
It is important to the standing and reputation of the U.N. and to the
people of Haiti that these new elements included an apology, even if the
apology was not in terms of the harm caused to the people of Haiti by the
negligence of the U.N. but rather in terms of the U.N. generally not doing
enough to help the people of Haiti deal with the cholera outbreak and its
spread. In this respect, the Secretary General was careful to cast the apology
in terms of the “moral responsibility” of the U.N., as distinguished from any
legal responsibility. Whether this apology and the enhanced efforts of the
U.N. to address the suffering of the Haitian people are sufficient to
effectively remove the “blemish” on the reputation of the U.N. remains to be
seen, especially in light of the challenges identified by the Secretary General
to the implementation of the new approach, both in terms of funding the new
approach and, in regard to the development of modalities and funding to
address the individual element of Track Two.
III. REMEDIES FOR HARM CAUSED BY U.N. PEACEKEEPERS IN REGARD TO
MISCONDUCT RELATING TO SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (SEA)
Sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. staff and officials and U.N.
peacekeepers became a significant issue during the 1990s and early 2000s in
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connection with the increase in U.N. peacekeeping activities in the Balkans
and Africa, particularly with widespread reports of such abuses by U.N.
peacekeeping troops and civilian staff of the U.N.’s mission in the Congo—
MONUC—in 2004.82 While the U.N. has repeatedly taken actions over the
years to address this problem, those actions failed to eliminate the problem.
Indeed, in the Spring of 2014, a new scandal arose in relation to allegations
that international troops serving in a U.N. authorized peacekeeping mission
in the Central African Republic (CAR) had sexually abused a number of
young children in exchange for food or money, and that the U.N. failed to act
timely or appropriately under U.N. policies and mandates in response to those
allegations.83 The scandal has led to new and proposed actions by the U.N.
to strengthen its regime against SEA.
In 2003, in response to reports of sexual exploitation of refugees by aid
workers in West Africa in the early 2000s, Secretary General Annan issued
a Bulletin expressly prohibiting conduct that constitutes SEA by U.N. staff,
including the staff of the separately administered organs and programs of the
U.N.84 The Bulletin stipulates that any acts of sexual exploitation and abuse
committed by U.N. staff members or persons under contract with the U.N.
“constitute acts of serious misconduct and are therefore grounds for
disciplinary measures, including summary dismissal”. 85 In addition to
disciplinary action, in cases where SEA has been determined to have
occurred, the U.N. routinely considers referral of the matter to the national
authorities of the perpetrator for prosecution or other appropriate action.86
Notably, U.N. civilian police and military observers and U.N.
peacekeeping troops were not covered by this Bulletin. 87 In 2004, the
Secretary General formally extended the prohibitions in the Bulletin to
civilian police and military observers.88 However, U.N. peacekeeping troops
are traditionally subject to the exclusive authority of their contingent
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commander and national authorities. Under the circumstances, it is up to that
commander and the national authorities of that Member State to address
allegations of SEA against these individuals.89
In 2005, in response to subsequent and numerous reports of SEA in
peacekeeping missions, the Secretary General commissioned a report by a
panel led by Ambassador Zeid from Jordan on the subject of SEA.90 The
resulting Zeid report addressed a wide spectrum of behavior ranging from
solicitation of prostitutes, which was legal in some host countries, to acts
considered criminal offenses in virtually all countries, such as rape and
pedophilia.91 This included rape disguised as prostitution, for instance when
the victim was given money or food to give the acts the appearance of
consent.92 In addition, the report addressed the issue of “peacekeeper babies”
which is very difficult to address because of the absence often of an effective
legal system in the host country.93
As the response to the Zeid report demonstrated, the issue of addressing
SEA in the U.N. peacekeeping context is complicated by the fundamental
nature of U.N. peacekeeping, where members of troop contributing
contingents are under the exclusive authority of the commanders of those
contingents, not the U.N. In a nutshell, the regime for military contingents
is that complaints are referred to national contingents who are responsible for
investigating and taking appropriate action. This has usually involved
repatriating the named individuals and following up in the troop contributing
member state. There is a responsibility to report the results of the
investigation and follow up action to the U.N.94 The Zeid panel came up with
a number of recommendations.95 Unfortunately, the U.N. General Assembly
declined to act on a number of those recommendations, primarily those that
would undermine the exclusive authority of the national troop contingent
commanders.
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Nonetheless, following the 2005 Zeid report, the U.N. implemented a
number of important initiatives to address SEA in order to educate and
sensitize both U.N. peacekeeping personnel and the local population as to
what SEA is and the responsibility of U.N. for responding to allegations of
such misconduct, including the procedures for dealing with complaints, and
measures for assisting the victims of SEA. Among these initiatives are the
following:
a) In 2007, the Model Memorandum of Understanding to be used
between troop contributing states and the U.N. was revised to include
and make applicable to U.N. peacekeeping contingents the specific
prohibitions against SEA from the 2003 Bulletin.96
b) In 2008, the U.N. adopted its Comprehensive Strategy on
Assistance to Victims of SEA by U.N. staff and related personnel.97 The
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance, specifically provides for basic
assistance and support to both complainants and victims of SEA.98
Assistance and support takes the form of medical care, legal services,
support to deal with psychological and social effects of the experience
as well as material care, such as food, clothing, emergency and safe
shelter.99 Children born as a result of SEA are to receive assistance with
their individual needs, and the U.N. is to work with member states to
facilitate within their competence, the pursuit of claims related to
paternity and child support.100 However, the Comprehensive Strategy
expressly provides at the outset that “the strategy shall in no way
diminish or replace the individual responsibility for acts of sexual
exploitation and abuse, which rests with the perpetrators” adding that
“the strategy is not intended as a means for compensation”.101 As this
provision suggests, SEA is considered in the same manner as ordinary
criminal acts by U.N. personnel, not U.N. actions for or which the U.N.
might be liable to third parties.
c) Also in 2008, the U.N. passed a resolution providing for the
criminal accountability of U.N. officials and experts on mission.102 That
resolution, inter alia, urged member States to consider establishing
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jurisdiction over crimes in their domestic laws committed by their
nationals while serving as U.N. officials or experts, at least where the
conduct as defined in the law of the State establishing jurisdiction also
constitutes a crime under the laws of the host state.103
d) In 2012, the Secretary General initiated a policy of human rights
screening of U.N. peacekeeping personnel to prevent selection and
deployment of individuals involved in human rights violations,
including SEA. 104 Under this policy, the Secretary General has
reaffirmed the authority to request the repatriation of any individual
contingent member alleged to having engaged in SEA or other human
rights violations.105 Indeed, the Secretary General has asserted the
authority to request the repatriation of entire units if the circumstances
so warranted. He has exercised that authority in connection with both
individual continent members and entire units.106
In addition, since the Zeid report, the Secretary General has issued
regular reports regarding the implementation of U.N. initiatives to address
SEA, including an annual report on “Special Measures for the Protection
from Exploitation and Sexual Abuse”. 107 Unfortunately, those reports
demonstrate that while the situation has improved, there continue to be
problems with compliance by troop contributing states, both in terms of
complaints of violations of the SEA prohibitions by contingent members and
with the timely follow up by troop contributing states on such complaints.108
In 2016, the independent Kompass Inquiry Panel issued its report.109
That report was highly critical of the U.N. and its handling of SEA in the
Central African Republic (CAR). Extraordinary for any U.N. inquiry, the
Kompass Report identified three very high officials that it said had abused
their authority and another seven high officials that were the subject of
“adverse observations” for failure to act appropriately in the face of the
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serious allegations of SEA. 110 The Kompass Report made twelve
recommendations for going forward to better deal with SEA in the
peacekeeping context.111
In February 2016, the Secretary General issued a report laying out his
plans for evaluating and addressing the recommendations of the Kompass
Report, including a number of measures already taken to address those
recommendations. The report also contained requests from the Secretary
General to the General Assembly to assist in addressing the
recommendations, including recommendations that related to the exclusive
authority of the Member States contributing U.N. peacekeeping troops over
such troops.112
In March 2016, the Security Council adopted a resolution addressing
the Kompass Report and the Secretary General’s initial response to the
report. 113 The Security Council endorsed the strong response by the
Secretary General to the continuing allegations of SEA in peacekeeping and
welcomed the appointment by the Secretary General of a Special Coordinator
to assist the Secretary General in improving the U.N.’s response to SEA,
while also affirming a number of the Secretary General’s ongoing
initiatives.114
In June 2016, the Secretary General issued his annual report on
“Combatting Sexual Exploitation andAbuse”where he updated his February
report on the ongoing efforts to evaluate and address the Kompass Inquiry
Report recommendations, and otherwise strengthen the Organizations
response to SEA.115 The Secretary General reported on the status of the
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recommendations.
Only four of the twelve were accepted without qualification:
recommendations four (mandatory and immediate reporting of all
allegations); six (review U.N. policies dealing with confidentiality); seven
(establishment of a trust fund for victims of SEA); ten (adoption of an
approach to immunity that presumes cooperation of U.N. staff in
accountability process).116
Five recommendations are partially accepted: one (acknowledge that
SEA by peacekeepers is a form of conflict related sexual violence to be
addressed under U.N. human rights policy); two (creation of a coordination
unit within Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
reporting directly to the Commissioner of OHCHR); three (creation of a
working group to support the Coordination Unit made up of experts to
develop a single policy harmonizing the SEA human rights policies and
develop processes promoting criminal accountability); eleven (the U.N.
negotiate with troop contributing states provisions for screening troops ); and
twelve (maintain a comprehensive and up to date human rights data base
hosted by OHCHR).117
The remaining three were “under consideration”: five (establishment of
a professional investigative team under the authority of the Coordination Unit
to be made available for immediate deployment when SEA is reported); eight
(the U.N. negotiate with troop contributing countries provisions to ensure
prosecution, including by granting host countries subsidiary jurisdiction to
prosecute); and nine (the U.N. negotiate the inclusion in agreements with
troop contributing countries provisions ensuring transparency and
cooperation in accountability processes).118
Notably, the three “under consideration” and most of the five only
“partially accepted” relate to the traditional exclusive authority of the
commander of the national contingent and national authorities of troop
contributing countries. These recommendations in many respects harken
back to the recommendations of the Zeid report on which the General
Assembly was unable to reach agreement because of the objections of troop
contributing countries.
Subsequently, the Secretary General issued his annual 2017 Report in
February dealing with Special Measures for the protection from sexual
abuse.119 The 2017 report presents the Secretary General’s “new approach”
to preventing and responding to SEA. Following on the Kompass Report and
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earlier responses by the Secretary General and the Organization to the
findings, conclusions and recommendations of that Report, the 2017
Secretary General’s report outlines a victim-centered strategy rooted in
transparency, accountability and ensuring justice. The “new approach” seeks
to build on a strong partnership with Member States.
The Secretary General’s 2017 report describes a four-part strategy.
First, elevating the voice of the victims themselves and putting their rights
and dignity at the forefront of the efforts to combat SEA. This would include
tangibly improving the medical, social, legal and financial assistance
provided to the victims “where appropriate”. Second, ending impunity for
those guilty of SEA. This would include greater transparency on reporting
and investigations. Third, building a truly multi stake network to support the
efforts of the U.N., which includes more direct and continuous engagement
with civil society and other experts and organizations. Fourth, raise
awareness worldwide regarding the problem of SEA to address the stigma
and discrimination that victims face and promote the U.N. as a global
platform for sharing best practices in prevention and response.120
Among the many proposals contained in the report, they include the
following relating to “Reconnecting to United Nations values and
principles”: strengthen the initial screening of candidates for every U.N.
post; ensure that individuals terminated owing to substantiated allegations of
SEA will not be rehired in any other part of the Organization; request that a
clause be included into the personal history profile or its equivalent as to
whether the applicant was the subject of pending allegations or disciplinary
measures at the time of separation, and agreeing to sharing this information
with other U.N. entities; cooperate, “as appropriate”, with Governments and
external organizations in the conduct of their own reference checks; and ask
Member States to enter voluntarily into a “Compact” on specific measures to
strengthen efforts to address SEA.121
In regard to “[p]utting the rights and dignity of victims first”, the report
proposes, inter alia to:
a) Conduct and issue the results of risk assessments of each
operational deployment in terms of SEA.122
b) Appoint a system wide victim’s right advocate reporting directly
to the Secretary General, to work within the Organization and with local
authorities and civil society organizations to ensure victims access to
appropriate and timely judicial processes; to ensure that every victim
receives appropriate personal care, follow up attention and information
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on the progress of his or her case; to build networks of support and to
assist in ensuring that the full effect of local laws are brought to bear.123
c) Instruct the appointment in the four peacekeeping operations with
the highest number of cases of SEA to identify a position to perform the
functions of victims’ right advocate, and request Member States to
regularize that position.124
d) Regularize and apply globally the 2016 Draft Victims’ Assistance
protocol following the ongoing pilot period testing.125
e) Request Member States to increase the resources to support
victims considering the following possible mechanisms: permit direct
assistance out of existing Trust Fund to Support Victims of SEA;
withhold reimbursement payments to troop contributing countries in the
event that investigations are not undertaken, reported on and concluded
in a timely manner and transfer the amounts withheld to the Trust
Fund.126
f) Request Member States receive claims from victims, and call upon
them to establish mechanisms to do so.127
g) Explore the possible use of ex gratis payments to victims in
exceptional cases and where the Member State mechanisms do not lead
to an appropriate outcome.128
h) Propose that mandating bodies (Security Council and General
Assembly) endorse, as appropriate, a special protocol on preventing
SEA as part of the mandates and budgets they approve that could
include, for example, strict guidelines on fraternization, prohibitions on
alcohol consumption.129
i) Seek Member State support for system wide consolidated
confidential repository of case information to be placed under the
supervision of the Special Coordinator on Improving the U.N. Response
to SEA.130
Some of the most important and controversial proposals in the report
relate to ending impunity:
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a) Improve speed, accuracy and comprehensiveness in report of
serious allegations of SEA, including the development of a standardized
incident reporting form.131
b) Support the strengthening of community based complaint
mechanisms.132
c) Present proposals to Member States for consolidating the many
investigative capacities throughout the Organization dealing with SEA,
creating specialist cadre of SEA investigators.133
d) Seek to establish clear procedures to address unacceptable
behaviors by implementing partners and commercial vendors who
operate in the name of the U.N.134
e) Strive to neither solicit nor accept contributions to the work of the
U.N. by any person, company or Government that does not demonstrate
an active commitment to the values of the U.N. in regard to SEA.135
f) Engage with Heads of State or Government of States that fail to
follow up after the U.N. refers SEA cases for their action.136
g) Renew call upon Member States to extend extraterritorial
jurisdiction over crimes that may be committed by their nationals when
assigned to the U.N. or operating under its authority.137
In the Report, the Secretary General elaborated on the commitments he
proposed Member States make under the voluntary Compact that he proposes
between him and those states. 138 Some of these commitments reflect
proposals already identified above, such as the commitment to cooperate
fully with the victims’ rights advocate; agree to implementation of
procedures to withhold reimbursement to U.N. troops in the event
investigations are not undertaken, reported or concluded in a timely manner,
and to transfer withheld payments to the Trust Fund in substantiated cases.139
Others are complimentary to these earlier proposals, such as appoint focal
points in capitals to serve as a direct liaison for victims to address potential
paternity claims and assist the U.N. in following up on such cases, and agree
to exercise or establish extraterritorial jurisdiction of crimes committed by
civilian personnel when assigned to the U.N. or operating under its
authority.140
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Other proposals, for example some of those relating to the conduct of
investigations bear on what has historically been viewed as the exclusive
authority of troop contributing states over their contingent members. 141
Some of these proposals are familiar, harkening back to the 1995 Zeid report
and the more recent Kompass Report. Thus, the Secretary General proposes
that in the proposed Compact, Member States commit to joint investigations
with the U.N. or with independent, external experts; or agree to “in situ” court
martials or permit live streaming to enable victims’ access to criminal
proceedings.142 There is also a proposal that Member States agree to obtain
DNA on a voluntary basis from all deployed personnel for purposes
exoneration or conviction where such evidence would be indispensable.143
The Secretary General specifically seeks to extend protection against
SEA to the conduct of non U.N. international forces authorized by the U.N.
by asking the Security Council to ensure that when it authorizes such
deployments it call on such states to take a variety of steps similar to those in
place for U.N. personnel, and to work with the regional organizations which
provide forces under the authorization of the U.N. otherwise to reduce the
potential for SEA. 144
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, both in regard to the Haiti
cholera claims and in regard to SEA, there have been significant
developments within the U.N. Those developments with respect to the Haiti
cholera claims suggest that the problems relating to the introduction of
cholera into Haiti arose more from failures to timely and conscientiously
follow the provisions of the existing regime that governs those matters. The
question in such circumstances is whether the U.N. can muster the political
will to do the right thing in a timely manner. It appears that as the end of his
term approached, the immediate past Secretary General paused to consider
whether the U.N. under his leadership had failed in the past and that he was
determined as he departed office to set a new course going forward.
Whatever happens going forward after his departure, the immediate past
Secretary General by his actions has helped to restore some of the U.N.’s
credibility that had been lost because of this matter over the past few years.
That said the question remains as to how the U.N. under the new Secretary
General will follow up on this initiative.
The situation regarding SEA is in a sense simpler and more complex.
As the Kompass Report amply demonstrates, the problems that have arisen
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were primarily driven clearly by failures to timely and conscientiously follow
existing mandates on U.N. offices and officials and the specific regime that
governs SEA. While that Report concludes that “fragmented bureaucracy”
contributed to the failure of the U.N. to prevent the sexual abuse of children
in the CAR, it also identified a “culture of impunity” and an “abdication of
responsibility”. Thus, it is clear from the report that the primary cause was
the failure of individuals with clear responsibilities and clear opportunities to
act, failed to do so. It is extraordinary that three of the highest-ranking
officials in the U.N. were found to have “abused their authority” and that
seven other high officials were the subjects of “adverse observations” in this
regard. A close reading of those findings must lead one to conclude that the
failure in this instance was one of individuals to act conscientiously and
timely under existing mandates and policies.
That said, the SEA situation is more complex in that it must address the
tensions between a vigorous and timely response to allegations of SEA and
the reluctance of troop contributing countries to surrender the exclusive
authority they have over their forces in a peacekeeping mission. This tension
addresses the regimes that govern SEA, and particularly the response by
troop contributing countries to allegations of SEA by their troops. This
tension became obvious with the Zeid report and is reflected again in the
response of the Secretary General to the twelve Kompass Report
recommendations, especially the three that were originally “under
consideration” as well as some of the five that were originally “partially
accepted.”
The new Secretary General, in his February 2017 SEA report, seeks to
resolve that tension, as did the Zeid and Kompass reports, in favor of greater
protections and more effective and timely responses to SEA.145 Specifically,
his proposals more fully reflect acceptance of the five recommendations that
were previously only “partially accepted” as well as the three that were only
“under consideration.”146 All eight of those recommendations, as previously
noted, relate to the traditional exclusive authority of troop contributing states
over their forces. There is no doubt that progress has already been made, and
more will be made. However, it remains to be seen whether and to what
extent the proposals relating to those eight recommendations in the Kompass
Report will be accepted by the General Assembly, including most
importantly by the troop contributing states who have resisted in the past
serious inroads to their traditional exclusive authority.
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